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potential employers may view longer tenure with a current employer as a negative signal regarding a
candidate’s level of cultural flexibility and adaptability, it may also provide opportunities for upward
mobility with the firm, which is a visible signal of competence. I find empirical support for these
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how clients’ preferences affect candidate selection and explore gender prejudice. I find evidence that is
line with role congruity theory, as firms are more likely to select male candidates when agentic qualities
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search firm) who has facilitated the process, specifically in its ability to work for the firm that lost its
employee to the broker’s client. The effect I find is positive and is stronger for poached firms that are
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ABSTRACT
ESSAYS ON EXECUTIVE SEARCH
Shinjae Won
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Matthew Bidwell
My dissertation focuses on how the market values different attributes of top managers and the role
of market intermediaries in shaping firm and individual outcomes. I draw on a unique dataset from an
executive search firm, which allows me to track the progress of nearly 1,700 top managers who emerged as
candidates for around 400 executive roles spanning multiple industries. In Chapter 2, I explore the mixed
signals sent by the frequency of moves between employers and tenure with their current employer at the
time a candidate is being considered for a senior management job with a new employer. I argue that while
frequently changing employer may decrease a candidate’s attractiveness to potential employers by
signaling that the candidate is a serial job hopper, it may also increase attractiveness by signaling the
accumulation of a breadth of experience typically valued in top managers. Also, while potential employers
may view longer tenure with a current employer as a negative signal regarding a candidate’s level of
cultural flexibility and adaptability, it may also provide opportunities for upward mobility with the firm,
which is a visible signal of competence. I find empirical support for these relationships. In Chapter 3, I use
the topic modeling technique to parse job descriptions to understand how clients’ preferences affect
candidate selection and explore gender prejudice. I find evidence that is line with role congruity theory, as
firms are more likely to select male candidates when agentic qualities are emphasized. In Chapter 4, I
investigate how employee mobility affects the broker (the executive search firm) who has facilitated the
process, specifically in its ability to work for the firm that lost its employee to the broker’s client. The
effect I find is positive and is stronger for poached firms that are located outside the city where the search
firm is located, suggesting that the poaching event may help the search firm increase its saliency towards its
potential clients. These studies together provide a better understanding of the executive labor market and
the role of market intermediary.
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CHAPTER 1: OVERVIEW

Executive- and top management-level employees have long received attention
because of their implications for firm performance and organizational effectiveness
(Gupta & Govindarajan, 2000; Virany & Tushman, 1986). As the minds and hands of
organizations1, who they are and what they do have been found to have a critical impact
on organizational outcomes. There is limited work, however, on another important actor
in this market: executive search firms who assist their clients in filling executive
vacancies (Khurana, 2002). Such a gap is surprising given their phenomenological
prevalence. According to a report by Association of Executive Search Consultants
(AESC) (2011), about half of all the executive placements are processed by hiring search
firms. In addition to their prevalence, they are also important because they allow
researchers to investigate important theoretical questions.
While the studies of executive search firms are few and far between, those that do
exist differ in how they approach the context. To better make sense of the usefulness of
the search context and to help researchers identify gaps and constructively develop future
streams of research, I propose three different perspectives on the functions of executive
search firms: search firms as windows, gatekeepers, and brokers. The first approach
emphasizes the value of the search context in answering generalizable questions about the

1

Management scholars oftentimes view each firm as a single decision-making entity when analyzing its
behaviors, but others have noted the importance of taking into account the individuals in the firm who are
in charge of processing internal and external information and executing on them (Hambrick & Mason,
1984). Although it may at times be difficult to identify who exactly is in charge of the formulation and
implementation of firm strategy (Child, 1972), it is fair to assume that the CEOs and the top managers are
closest to the minds and hands in most organizations.
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executive selection. The second approach focuses on the role that executive firms play in
shaping the labor market outcome for individuals. The third approach pays attention to
the triadic nature of the relationship between the search firm, individual executive and the
client firm and studies the dynamics between the different actors. Previous studies using
the search firm context fall into one of these three categories, and I roadmap different
questions and gaps that stem from each.
I also highlight the theoretical and empirical advantages of using data from search
firms to answer important questions around executive selection, executive career, and
dynamics of a mediated market. For example, search firms accumulate information on the
vacancies (such as position and pay) and the considered candidates for those vacancies,
including unsuccessful as well as successful candidates. This gives researchers theoretical
advantage by allowing the parsing of the supply and demand-side of the selection
mechanism, which is difficult to do when only the successful candidates are observed.
The empirical advantage comes from the fact that a single search firm facilitates searches
across a number of clients in various industries. These unique advantages allow
researchers to induce generalizable insights that can be applied to the broader context.
After introducing the three different perspectives and advantages of search firm
data, in following chapters 2 through 4, I explore and tackle the following questions
empirically: In chapter 2, I study the selection of senior managers as a function of the
candidate’s past career record, specifically focusing on the frequency of
interorganizational moves and the tenure at the current firm. I show how different career
strategies may emerge from workers’ choices in this era of boundaryless career and how
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potential employers perceive mobility signals such as workers’ frequency of moves and
the tenure at the current employer in conjunction with the diversity of functional
experiences and records of internal promotions.
In chapter 3, by using the topic modeling method, I investigate how a client’s
mental model of an ideal candidate translates into preference for certain concrete
characteristics of candidates. By taking advantage of the variation in what is emphasized
in the candidate requirement, which is a proxy for clients’ mental model about an ideal
candidate, I look at whether it impacts the selection of candidates with certain observable
characteristics such as gender and type of work experiences and how the selection differs
between the client firm and the search firm.
In chapter 4, in order to understand the role that search firms play as brokers in
shaping the executive labor market, I explore the dynamics of relationship formation
between search firms and potential clients. Specifically, I focus employee departures that
are facilitated by the search firm. What happens in an organization after a search firm
helps hire an employee away from that organization?
Before reviewing the organizing the related literature under the three perspectives,
I provide an overview of what executive search firms do and explain why they exist in
the market for executives.

4
Background
What are Executive Search Firms?
In essence, executive search firms are a type of a labor market intermediary that mediates
between employers and individual executives (Autor, 2009). They are the “matchmakers”
according to the proposed taxonomy of labor market intermediaries described by Bonet
and her colleagues (2013), in that they seek out potential candidates and screen them on
behalf of the client. Among the five main HR functions – (1) staffing, (2) retention, (3)
development, (4) adjustment, and (5) managing change (Cascio, 1986, p. 6) – they
specialize in staffing, especially on recruiting, and then helping clients select candidates
to fill vacancies. These practices are not only among the most important functions but
also are central to the internal practices of the organization.
Basic vacancy-filling model
It will be helpful to sketch out how firms independently conduct searches (without the
help of search firms) in order to understand what executive search firms do differently.
When the firm decides to fill the vacant position externally, the firm will first put together
a job description – who they are, what the position entails and what they are looking for
in candidates. Then, they will create a pool of candidates. This entails choosing a
recruiting channel, either posting the job or using their networks or both. This is also the
stage where the firm might decide to restrict the search to the internal labor market
(Windolf, 1986). After a pool is created, the firm will set out to screen them, initially
from the submitted materials (e.g., CVs) and eventually by interviewing a subset of the
promising candidates. They will select the best candidate and extend an offer. The terms
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will be negotiated, and the offer will be accepted. If not, they will move on to the next
best candidate. Some firms will choose to fill the vacancy on a rolling basis – that is, they
will not wait to screen the candidates until they have created a substantial pool of
candidates. Instead, they will start screening the candidates as they apply, and will extend
an offer if they find a candidate who is above the threshold that they have set.
Executive search firms help their clients in all of these processes from building a job
description to creating a candidate pool and conducting initial screening. The final
selection is made by the client firms, but search firms also help mediate the terms of the
contract when the candidate they identify is hired by their client firm (Khurana, 2002).

Why Do Firms Hire Executive Search Firms?
Firms constantly face “make or buy” decisions in many aspects of their operations, and
previous work has noted how many of the HR functions of firms are now commonly
outsourced (Lepak & Snell, 1998) including those that are close to core competencies
such as training and development (Gainey & Klaas, 2005; Greer, Youngblood, & Gray,
1999). When the need to fill an executive vacancy arises, firms would first look within to
identify and reallocate employees (H. C. White, 1970). When there isn’t an obviously
fitting candidate within the organization, the firm will have to choose to “buy” rather than
“make” the executive. To facilitate this “buying,” the firm then has to make another
“make” or “buy” choice with regard to how to bring in an external executive. They have
the choice of (1) using their existing recruiting personnel to find a candidate, (2) hiring
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new recruiting personnel with executive hiring capabilities, or (3) hiring external search
firms to complete the task outside the firm. The decision tree is depicted in Figure 1.1.
-- Insert Figure 1.1 Here -Hence, from the client’s point of view, whether to hire a search firm or not in the
first place is essentially a question of where to draw the firm boundary regarding the task
of hiring top executives. A firm using the first two options is ultimately building those
capabilities in-house, whereas the third option keeps those capabilities outside and
making a short-term spot contract with an outside contractor – an executive search firm –
who has the needed capabilities to carry out the task of finding the candidates for the
vacancies. In that regard, the existing literature on firm boundaries may help shed some
light on why firms may prefer to hire external search firms rather than relying on their
internal resources or procuring experts to carry it out in-house. Why do they decide to
push this crucial task outside the firm boundary?

Explanations from TCE perspective
Transaction cost economics (TCE) is one useful lens to understand this question
regarding the firm boundaries. It clearly sets out criteria – the frequency of exchange,
uncertainty, and specificity (O. E. Williamson, 1985) – for assessing whether performing
a transaction is more efficiently conducted in-house or in the external market. The
assumption is that vendors are opportunistic, hence, when the frequency, uncertainty, and
specificity are high, they are likely to take advantage of incomplete contracts and make it
more inefficient than in-house operations. These criteria are theorized at the task level,
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deciding whether or not a certain operation will be outsourced to an outside vendor. That
is the frequency, uncertainty and specificity of the executive search vary by certain
vacancies. For the purpose of this exercise, though, I will evaluate an “average” executive
position against the three criteria, and then also discuss how it can vary at the firm and
vacancy level.
First, in terms of frequency, there are typically a limited number of executive
positions in organizations; hence, the hiring for those positions happens rarely.
Consequently, it would not be cost efficient for the firm to create a separate team of
personnel to search given that they would not be needed very often. This aspect becomes
more prominent if each executive search is different in the job requirements and where
the supply of applicants would be found. For example, firms at times need to tap into
pools of potential candidates that it does not know well and has not maintained close or
frequent contact with. For example, if a firm wants to hire a “diversity” candidate,
usually meaning a female or ethnic minority, it may need to seek out a search firm that
has access to a bigger pool of such candidates (Bonet et al., 2013).
Second, the uncertainty in this context is whether the client firm is able to assess
the performance of the search firm (Masters & Miles, 2002). Although the search is
considered to be successful when it is completed, there is neither a continuous measure to
gauge the success of the placement nor a metric to assess the quality of the process of the
search. The performance of hired executives will be revealed sooner or later after the
placement, though, and although this will not affect the fee that is already paid for, it will
impact whether the client firm chooses to use the search firm’s service again.
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Third, the task of executive selection requires a high level of asset-specificity,
which necessitates the recruiter to possess a deep understanding of the organization in
order to find the best candidate.
Even though the high level of uncertainty and asset-specificity argues against
using executive search firms, the process used by search firms (i.e., managing only a
certain part of the entire search process) seems to let the client firm bypass high levels of
uncertainty and asset-specificity. For example, it is common for a search firm to
temporarily exit the picture once it has helped the client firm revise its job description,
screened the initial pool of candidates, and created a shortlist of candidates. Then the
client firm interviews those candidates, after which they will give an offer to one of the
candidates. Indeed, the issue of “control” is said to be an important factor that
determines the success of outsourcing (Barthelemy, 2003), and in this context, the client
firm is able to maintain a certain level of such control. Hence, the job of filling an
executive vacancy seems to lean towards the “buy” option according to the TCE criteria.
The TCE framework, however, is limited in that it assumes away the difference in
terms of general knowledge other than firm- (or asset-) specific knowledge. In fact,
search firms may have more information on potential candidates and be in a better
position to accurately check the information on potential candidates. This is because
specialization allows recruiters at search firms to harness skills in executive recruiting,
and because sometimes candidates from previous searches are considered again for
subsequent searches (Benner, Brownstein, Dresser, & Leete, 2001; Bull, Ornati, &
Tedeschi, 1987; King, Burke, & Pemberton, 2005). These arguments suggest that search
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firms are able to carry out the job better than in-house recruiters because of the superior
general skills and knowledge base in executive recruiting. This would be true assuming
that they are also able to thoroughly learn the clients’ preferences and what the positions
entail, so that they can find the best match for the vacancy.

Explanations from the “middlemen” perspective
Yet another set of arguments points to another reason to choose the “buy” option.
Some have argued that search firms are not only able to carry out the job better, but also
have an incentive to do so. Biglaiser (1993) draws out a theoretical model to show that
middlemen have incentives to invest in the capabilities to discern the quality of a good
and report this information truthfully because of the scale and reputation concerns.
Although these works are in the context of middlemen who facilitate trade between
buyers and sellers in the market for goods (such as jewelry or art dealers), it provides
useful insight for the search firm-mediated labor market2. The scale argument is similar
to the frequency argument in the TCE framework. Search firms will process more
executive searches than an average firm and hence have the incentive to invest in
capabilities and resources, such as hiring expert recruiters and investing in technologies
and platforms to manage the data, as well as building and maintaining relationships with
potential candidates. The reputation argument is also relevant in the executive search
context in that ensuring high-quality search and customer satisfaction is likely to bring

2

One critical difference in the executive search context and the models in these papers (base on Shapiro,
1983) is that the supplier is able to choose between the production of low- and high-quality goods. In our
context, the supplier is the individual candidate, whose quality is exogenously given. The high type
candidate has an option to exert low effort after getting hired, but the incentive to keep the job is likely to
curb such behavior.
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additional business either from the satisfied client itself or other clients. Additionally, it is
common for search firms to guarantee a redo of a search at no additional cost in case the
candidate is fired early on. Knowing this, the search firm is unlikely to behave
opportunistically by compromising the quality of search even if it the quality is not
immediately observable when the search closes.

Explanations related to legitimacy
While the first set of reasons laid out above – from the TCE perspective and the
“middlemen” perspective – is related to the issue of the economic cost and efficiency, the
second set of reasons goes beyond the efficiency argument. Khurana (2002) suggests that
engaging a search firm provides legitimacy to the process in the eyes of internal and
external stakeholders. According to him, even when the client firm has sufficiently
identified potential internal candidates and has knowledge of their qualities, it is common
for the client firm to work with a search firm in order to demonstrate that they have
consulted the professionals and used the most objective means to evaluate and select
candidates, free of vested interest. Although the hiring committee from the client firm
should act as a representative of the firm, the individuals who are on the committee may
act in their own interest that is not aligned with the firm. Hence, the firm is able to ensure
its stakeholders that it monitors and prevents such self-dealing behaviors by hiring an
outside expert.
An interesting argument from previous literature is that search firms allow firms
to “legitimately” poach from competitors (Khurana, 2002). The argument is that the
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client firm who has hired a search firm is able to bypass the “social norm” of the market
by framing it as the mere result of the search firm trying to fulfill the contractual
obligation. Khurana argues that by employing a search firm, the client firm is able to
appeal to the idea of a “free market,” rather than its social aspects. Yet, when discussing
the “social norm,” it is unclear which audience he is referring to. Naturally, the firms that
could potentially be raided will be opposed to other firms hiring away its employees
because it creates the direct cost of turnover. But hiring from competitors not only hurts
the sender firms but also other firms in the market – including the receiver firms –
because the competition to hire ultimately allows workers to have bargaining power over
their wages (Coff, 1997). Hence, poaching from a competitor is, in essence, a good
practice from worker’s point of view.
In fact, a 2009 lawsuit claimed that several companies in Silicon Valley – Adobe
Systems, Apple, Google, Intel, Intuit, and Pixar – conspired to keep their employee wage
artificially low by agreeing to not poach from each other (“anti-poaching,” “no-hire” or
“no-solicitation”) 3. It turns out that even though the agreement between these tech giants
was only verbal, the companies enforced it by punishing the people in charge when there
was an attempt to hire. For example, Eric Schmidt, who was a CEO of Google at that
time, promptly fired a Google recruiter who approached an Apple employee by email
when Jobs forwarded this email to Schmidt (Wallace, 2014). The court eventually ruled
that this is a violation of the Sherman Antitrust Act of 1890 and asked the defendants to
3

A similar phenomenon is the non-compete agreement which sanctions employees from moving to a
competitor of the former employer (Marx, 2011). Non-compete agreements are not enforceable in
California, which partially explains why anti-poaching collusions emerged between the major actors in
Silicon Valley.
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compensate the affected workers in this scheme (Reich, 2015). The antitrust law was
originally written to protect customers from paying higher prices because of lack of
competition, but the same principle also applies for employees receiving lower wages.
As such, an agreement between two companies to not poach from each other is
illegal, but could the market for the sender firm punish the firm that poached from the
competitor? On the one hand, it is hard to imagine that the market will punish the
receiver firm. If the receiver firm was able to poach from its competitor, it is likely to
work to their advantage and have a positive impact on the firm’s performance. The
sender firm, on the other hand, may act antagonistically towards the firm that poached
away its employee, and may retaliate by poaching or via other means. As Khurana
suggested, the sender firm may be less aggravated if the poaching was facilitated by a
search firm rather than the competitor firm directly targeting them because it can be
framed as the result of having the search firm search for the best talent. Whether or not
this is actually true calls for further investigation.
Khurana also argues that it is more acceptable for candidates to receive calls from
search firms than from competitor firms. Although he did not explicitly specify which
party finds it acceptable or not, I suspect that both the current employer and potential
employers will be judging such move made by the candidate. Although the non-competes
act protects the employer to certain extent, moving to a competitor is more likely to lead
to the loss at the sender firm compared to a move to a non-competitor firm. Hence, when
a candidate accepts a call from a competitor, the candidate is agreeing to cause such harm
to the current employer. When the candidate explores opportunities with the search firm,
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however, the candidate hears about the opportunity before knowing the identity of the
new employer, so the audience can be more understanding that the harm caused is more
of a byproduct of a career change.

Explanations related to confidentiality
Lastly, executive search firms facilitate employees’ mobility between employers
by ensuring confidentiality on both the candidate side and the client side until the search
process has matured. For candidates, search firms discretely help them conceal the fact
that they seeking outside opportunities. This is a big concern for candidates since it may
lead to negative dynamics with colleagues at the current firm should they fail to move to
the new employer. Such reassurance will be more salient with a more reputable search
firm that may have established the reputation to handle the process carefully. In
comparison, individual firms do not have much incentive to take caution in keeping
confidentiality and it is hard to establish such a track record because of the volume of
executive search is small. The candidates may be more willing to explore the new
opportunity if they are convinced that information about their searching activity will be
safe kept, and this is going to help search firms dip into a wider pool of passive
candidates.
In addition, search firms allow them to consider a broader pool of candidates from
other firms, including their competitors whom they may be sanctioned by for poaching
directly from (Khurana, 2002). Until the candidate is also interested in the position, the
name of the client firm will not be revealed, guaranteeing that the information about the
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search may stay within a selected group of people – the candidates who are qualified and
seriously considering the position – until it is consummated. Hypothetically, the above
example about Google firing a recruiter for a mere email to an Apple employee about an
opportunity may have been avoided if a search firm handled the process. The name of the
client is usually not revealed in the earlier stage, and should the Apple employee be not
interested or qualified after initial screening, Apple would not have found out that Google
was trying to recruit its employee away4.
Although the rise of other means of search such as LinkedIn is said to be
threatening this industry by making it easier for employers to conduct external searches
on their own, many of the aforementioned functions of search firms are not easily
replaceable by such other means. LinkedIn, for example, may help firms to quickly locate
potential candidates, but it may overwhelm them with the sheer number of potential
candidates. The firm will still need to allocate its internal resources to winnow them
down, conduct background searches on a smaller set of candidates and carry out the
initial interviews. More importantly, confidentially will not be addressed, and the firms
may not take advantage of the “mediated contact” that frees them from the stigma of
poaching from their competitors. They also will not be able to benefit from the extra
legitimacy that search firms confer. These reasons together explain the prevalence and
significance of search firms in executive hiring.

4

But of course, the poaching will be revealed if the Apple employee made it to the final round and received
an offer from Google.

15
Explanations from the networks perspective
Another lens through which we can understand the existence of executive search
firms is the literature on brokerage. In essence, search firms occupy the “structural holes”
(Burt, 2000) that exist between the potential candidates and the firms with vacancies in
their executive-level positions. Burt suggests that the occupants of the structural holes
possess power as long as the threat of triadic closure – creation of a direct tie between the
two actors who have previously had only indirect relationship through their respective
relationship with the broker – is low. Bielby and Bielby also stressed the structural
advantage that core agencies have over other actors in the market (1999). What is unique
about this context is that the search firms as brokers facilitate the match itself as well as
bridge information. Therefore, the structural hole will only disappear if the clients
directly (evaluate and) hire the candidates without the help of the search firm. Clients still
may not be able to directly hire the candidates even if they have the information about
them. The confidentiality and legitimacy arguments above suggest that search firms also
play an important role as a facilitator of matching (even after putting the information and
efficiency arguments aside), meaning the threat of such triadic closure is low. Because
search firms are connected with parties that are otherwise hard to connect to from the
clients’ perspective, bridging the gaps between those two parties allows the search firms
to capture some of the value that is created from this match.
Although the network position gives search firms the bargaining power with both
client firms and potential candidates because of the essential role it plays in matching
these two parties, they are always vulnerable to the entry of other search firms that could
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play a similar role. To the extent that other search firms can replace their service, the
client firm is expected to have an upper hand in this relationship (Brandenburger &
Stuart, 1996). Hence, I believe that the degree of power that they share will vary by the
market depending on the density of search firms. The search industry is dominated by ten
top players who capture 10% of the entire market, and there are also many smaller
companies as well as mom-and-pop boutiques that are more specialized in terms of the
industry or geography5. Because there are only a few big players, these players will be
able to enjoy a certain degree of bargaining power to both client firms and workers. The
client firm will especially be subject to the power of a prominent search firm when it is
concerned with the legitimizing function of the search firm. Otherwise, when the use is
purely for functional reasons such as cost and informational advantage, they are more
likely to hire the firm where the trusted consultant is currently employed. As with many
other professional services firms such as law or consulting firms, the core competency of
the business lies at the heart of each of the consultants.

Summary
All of these factors that explain why search firms exist can be used to predict
which firms are more likely to hire search firms. For example, firms that do not

5

One interesting feature about this industry that makes such co-existence of big and small firms possible is
the “off-limits agreement.” It means that the search firm and the client firm enter into a contract that
prohibits the search firm from considering candidates from that client firm in their future searches for other
clients. Usually the agreement lasts for approximately two years, and the boundary of the “limits” (e.g., the
entire firm, a specific department or specific group of people with certain job titles) is also agreed upon at
the time of drafting the contract. The existence of this agreement implies that the bigger firms with more
clients face bigger limitations in terms of where they can source the candidates, compared to smaller firms
with a smaller client base. This, combined with the fact that there is a relatively low barrier to entry, allows
the industry to be populated with a lot of small players along with a few giants.
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frequently experience turnover or are smaller in size will also find it more cost-efficient
to work with contractors rather than bring in the capability in-house. Also, younger firms
with fewer years of experience and lacking external networks in the industry may want to
tap into a broader pool by working with the experts. Similarly, firms that recently
suffered from poor performance may want to convince their stakeholders that they are
filling the vacancy in the best way possible. Also, the factors help predict whether a
particular search will be more likely to call for a search firm or not. For example, TCE
would suggest if the hiring process is not costly to monitor, or if the position is low in
asset-specificity, using an outside contractor may be effective. Also, a specific vacancy
may require the firm to tap into a pool outside of the existing networks. Finally, some
positions may be strategically important for firms that it may hurt to broadcast the search
to outside firms since the search activity may reveal strategic directions the firms might
take. These variations exist within firms, and some vacancies may benefit more than
other vacancies from working with search firms.
-- Insert Table 1.1 Here --

Overview of Existing Literature on Executive Search Firms

Existing academic research on executive search firms is limited, despite the prevalence of
their services in the executive labor market. There are a few initial qualitative works that
have helped us better understand the workings of the industry, followed by more recent
empirical studies that delve into specific aspects of this context. This existing research
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largely addresses three types of questions: First, what can we learn about who gets
selected for these jobs that can be generalized beyond the mediated search context? For
example, what kinds of track records are valuable in this market, such as employment at a
reputable employer or prestigious degree? Does it help to be a specialist or a generalist?
How do demographic characteristics (gender, ethnicity, age) play a role in executive
selection? Second, how do search firms impact executive selections and shape the
executive labor market independent of what would happen in any case? Third, how does
the brokered nature of the relationships between the candidate, firm and the client affect
their behaviors and outcomes of each of the involved parties?
I call the first type of question the “search firms as windows,” the second type of
question the “search firms as gatekeepers” and the third type of question the “search firm
as brokers.” I explain each of these approaches in further detail below.
-- Insert Table 1.2 Here --

Search Firms as Windows vs. Gatekeepers
Given the important role that top executives play in modern organizations, it is
important to understand the process organizations use to fill those crucial vacancies, and
who gets selected into these jobs. How does the organization process executive selection,
and who are getting these jobs? What kind of characteristics and type of experiences
matters in getting these jobs? Does education still matter? Are gender and ethnic
minorities disadvantaged? Do firms want executives to be specialists or generalists? Does
a record of being a job-hopper hurt?
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These questions have been tackled to different degrees in the existing literature,
but most works could not effectively parse supply-side and demand-side forces due to
limited data availability (Fernandez & Sosa, 2005). This problem applies to any research
question that hopes to answer why differences in labor outcome (access to high rank,
high paying jobs) exist between different demographic groups or people with different
backgrounds. For example, the fact that we see fewer women in the C-suite can be due to
the fact that their competence is discounted at the time of hiring, or because fewer women
applied in the first place. The former case will speak to the biases that firms have that
leads to gender discrimination, and the latter case will need more investigation into what
kind of behavioral and structural barriers keep women from applying for these positions
(given that there is a critical amount of female candidates who are qualified for executive
jobs). These have different theoretical and practical implications.
This is the exact theoretical challenge that search firm data can help overcome. It
allows researchers to parse the supply-side and demand-side mechanisms because search
firms accumulate information on successful as well as unsuccessful candidates for each
search. Knowing who is the decision maker in this process and having information on the
consideration set for the selection allows us to understand the selection process.
Compared to other settings that researchers can use to study executive selection,
the search firm context also has an empirical advantage. Although top executives
themselves are highly visible in sizeable public companies, the selection process of those
executives is commonly enclosed in a black box. For example, it is difficult to know who
gets considered for the job and who gets ahead in the process, without relying on
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qualitative case studies from a single or a limited number of companies. Most previous
works in this arena either used few case studies with rich accounts of the selection
process (Gouldner, 1954) but lacked power to find statistically significant patterns, or
relied on archival data with a number of data points on the outcome (the selected CEOs
or the managers) but lacked detailed information about the selection process itself
(Koyuncu, Firfiray, Claes, & Hamori, 2010). In the latter case, as explained above, it is
impossible to tell if the observed statistical patterns are conceived from employers’ or
candidates’ preferences. Hence, the executive search data in effect combines the
advantages from each of these two settings to quantitatively study executive selection
across a number of companies.
Before answering the question of “who gets selected” using search firm data,
however, it is important to think about whether or not the search firm influences the
selection outcome of the recruitment process, in a way that is different from how the
client would have handled the search. One approach (“the windows”) assumes away such
difference while another approach (“the gatekeepers”) focuses on the difference between
the search firm and the client firm.
On the one hand, Khurana’s work (2002) suggests that the search firm only
minimally influences the outcome and credits the search firms mostly for their
legitimacy-conferring function. This idea is quite salient in his extreme example where
the client firm has already selected a candidate internally but works with a search firm to
merely legitimize the process. In this case, adding the service of the search firm would
not have impacted the mechanics of the search outcome at all. Although such an extreme
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case seems to be rare in most searches conducted by the search firm (after all, the client
pays a hefty fee for their service), one could also think that the objective of the client firm
and the search firm is well-aligned since the search firm will only be able to secure future
businesses from the client when the client is sufficiently satisfied with its service. If that
is the case, we safely abstract the search firm and the client firm into a single entity that
processes the search. Then we could think that the search firm context is analogous to a
“window” through which researchers can study executive selection in general. It serves
as a window because it provides a great empirical setting into the details of the matching
of firms and candidates including both the successful and unsuccessful candidates, as
described above.
On the other hand, other works propose that the search firm may play a role in
shaping the selection process and outcomes that affect individuals’ employment
opportunity and the pay that the employees receive from the new employer. FernandezMateo and King (2011) suggest the possibility that agents may not share the same
selection criteria with the hiring firm, that they engage in “anticipatory sorting” by
sorting female candidates into queues for lower-paying jobs with the expectation that the
clients would prefer to hire male candidates.
Although Fernandez-Mateo and King's work is based in the context of temporary
staffing agencies, it is imaginable that a similar process exists in the executive search
context as well. Without having clearly communicated what the client firm wants in
terms of gender of the candidate, it is possible that the search firm expects the client to
prefer male candidates. Under this perspective where there may exist misalignment
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between the search firm and the client firm, we can view search firms as “gatekeepers” to
executive jobs since they are in charge of the initial process of the search, and only those
that can pass through the search firm’s scrutiny may have a chance to land those
executive jobs. Below, I explain in more detail and organize the existing literature using
these two lenses that I have described. After that, I attempt to reconcile the two different
perspectives.

Search Firms as Windows
Authors who view search firms as windows do not theoretically distinguish between the
recruiters at the search firm and the hiring authorities at the client firm; rather, these two
parties are assumed to be a team who are working towards the same goal of finding the
best candidate to fill the vacancy. The assumption is that the search firm will try to do
exactly what the client wants, and the client is hiring them largely because of the
concerns about the cost and speed. Hence, the implications of these findings are certainly
applicable to contexts broader than the executive search firm setting. One might also
think that it can also be generalized to firms who independently perform these searches
without hiring search firms. This is plausible as long as there isn’t a selection bias among
firms. For example, if it is primarily the resource constraints that influence whether to
hire a search firm or not, we can think that resourceful firms may hire differently
compared to more constrained firms. Firms that are constrained in terms of resources may
favor conservative candidates who have demonstrated their competence in the same role
in their previous jobs because they do not have the slack to absorb the risk an
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unconventional candidate may bring. Nevertheless, the findings that generalize within a
subgroup of firms that do hire search firms makes up a substantial portion of the
executive labor market; thus it is worthwhile studying these selections to understand
executive selection.
Coverdill and Finlay’s work (1998) is an illustrative example of a case where
search firm context is used as a window through which we can better understand the
executive hiring and personnel selection in general. Their detailed qualitative accounts
help us better understand how the notion of “fit” matters in executive search. They find
that technical skills are the minimum requirements that get the candidates to the smaller
pool of consideration set, from which the “softer” factors such as the fit or “hot buttons”
become the deciding factors in the later rounds.
We should note, however, that their work is based on their study of contingency
firms, which used to be the more popular form of contract at that time, but are no longer
prominent in executive search. With contingency firms, the client firm would contact and
work with multiple search firms, and only the search firm that succeeds in placing the
candidate would get paid. More recently, contingency schemes only apply to search firms
that process lower-ranking jobs; most of the executive search firms now operate on a
retained basis where the client pays an upfront retainer fee regardless of whether the
client succeeds in filling the vacancy through the search firm or not (Hamori, 2010). Such
a shift in the client-search firm relationship, from one-to-many to one-to-one increases
the empirical value of search firm data for research purposes because a single search firm
will have all the information on each of the searches that clients delegate to them. This is
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more advantageous for researchers compared to a setting with contingent search firms,
where the considered candidates for a single search would have been scattered across
multiple search firms.
Another study that shows the value of the search context to understand a broader
phenomenon about the labor market is Cappelli and Hamori (2013)’s work on the
likeliness to opt into the search process when contacted by the headhunters. Although
they do not make an assumption about the client firm and the search firm’s similarity or
differences in terms of selection, they take advantage of the variation in response when
search firms initially reach out. Focusing on the candidate’s initial decision to participate
in the process or not, which is a small but important aspect of the search process, this
work sheds light on what factors affect executives’ intention to move by finding that
managers are more likely to say yes to a headhunter’s phone call when they have had
broad experiences across industries and functions, and when they face uncertainty in their
future career due to organizational-level shocks such as M&A activities.
The search context is particularly useful to study this question of the likelihood of
mobility as it measures the willingness to move (saying “yes” to the headhunter) that has
a lower threshold of manifestation than the actual mobility itself while being a necessary
condition to making an actual move. One thing to note here is whether the response will
be different if the first call was made by the client firm itself or the search firm. For
clients who are not reputable employers as the search firm is, the search firm may provide
legitimacy to this call, lowering the candidates’ threshold to “say yes.”
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As in the examples above, the search firm context provides valuable insights
about executive selections and mobility intentions that can be generalized beyond the
search context itself.

Search Firms as Gatekeepers
While these “Search Firms as Windows” studies induce generalizable insights from the
search industry context, such as how “fit” plays a role in hiring decisions and when
executives are likely to consider leaving for a new job, there are also other studies that
focus on the role that the search firm plays as a gatekeeper to the seats in upper echelon
(Dreher, Lee, & Clerkin, 2011; Fernandez-Mateo & King, 2011). This view essentially
asks the question of “how would the world look without executive search firms?”
Existing research finds that search firms favor the more traditional type of
executives in terms of demographics – white males – (Dreher et al., 2011) and candidates
from reputable firms (Cappelli & Hamori, 2013). The search firm also tends to develop
and maintain a closer relationship with those traditional candidates, exacerbating the
unequal outcome between them and the rest of the potential candidates (Dreher et al.,
2011). They suggest that because most of the search consultants at search firms are white
males, women, and racial minorities are disadvantaged by the biases that these search
consultants have and have limited access to their informal networks. They argue that
white male search consultants are more likely to favor white male candidates as they
think such individuals would be more fitting in a hiring firm’s organizational culture.
Also, there is a wealth of evidence of homophily in the hiring literature (Rivera, 2012).
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The implication from these studies is that the search firm amplifies and maintains the
existing income and status inequality between certain demographic groups, and it also
lends support to the existing body of research regarding the self-reinforcing nature of
reputation and status (Benjamin & Podolny, 1999; Merton, 1968; Pfarrer, Pollock, &
Rindova, 2010). This phenomenon is found outside of the U.S. and U.K. context as well,
as evident in Tienari and her colleagues’ work with executive search consultants in
Finland, Austria and Sweden (Tienari, Meriläinen, Holgersson, & Bendl, 2013). While
the studies in this vein discuss the type of candidates that are more likely to be considered
and selected by the search firm and the hiring organizations, the question is closely
related to how the search firms shape executive careers. Hamori (2014) found that
executives who are placed by search firms are more likely to be promoted and likely to
move to larger and more reputable firms compared to executives who move via other
means. These results suggest that those who are favored by search firms not only have
more opportunities but better opportunities when they seek career opportunities outside
their current employer.
While most research puts weight on how search firms may hinder the upward
mobility of minorities, especially women, recent evidence finds limited evidence of such
a “pipe-bending” role of search firms, that women are as likely as men to be selected by
the search firm (Fernandez-Mateo & Fernandez, 2016). There is even evidence that
search firms take the initiative to advance the diversity agenda for the client firm, at least
in the context of hiring board members (Doldor, Vinnicombe, Gaughan, & Sealy, 2012).
In this case, search firms act as a catalyst to propagate good practices. While the study
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does not explicitly discuss whether they may be more effective promoters than other
firms, it seems to imply so. First, they may be able to spread good practices more
effectively compared to a market without brokers because of their structural advantage
and the legitimacy that it confers. Second, in this context of promoting female board of
directors, search firms are in a position to be able to identify, develop6 and position highquality female candidates (Doldor et al., 2012).
Such variance in the role of search firms in shaping candidate outcomes calls for
deeper investigation into the cause of the difference between the search firms and the
client firms. In other words, if the search firm and the client firm indeed think and choose
differently, it would be worthwhile to understand the antecedents of those differences.
One source of difference is an inaccurate prediction about the preferences of the
clients (Fernandez-Mateo & King, 2011). As mentioned above, Fernandez-Mateo and
King (2011) found that the staffing agency is more likely to shortlist female candidates
on the queues for lower paying jobs which may adversely impact their outcome in the
later stage (Fernandez & Mors, 2008). Interestingly, they find that the client firms are
actually more likely to choose female candidates. The authors suggest that such
misalignment may stem from the agency’s inaccurate assumption about the client’s
preferences. Over time, however, we might expect such misalignment to disappear as the
search firm learns the preference of the client firms.

Interviews of search consultants by Doldor and her colleagues revealed that some search firms “develop
deeper relationships with women in the pipeline” and “engage with talented women […] with the long-term
aim of preparing for NED (non-executive director) roles.”
6
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The assumption in this study is that the search firm can and will act in the same
way the client would had it possessed the accurate knowledge about the client’s
preferences. We could also think that certain preferences, such as those regarding gender
or other demographic characteristics, could have particularly been less communicated to
the agency compared to other requirements such as skills or education levels.7
Another source of differential selection may stem from different knowledge and
past experiences. For example, the search firm is more likely to have experience in terms
of selecting candidates, especially if the client firm had historically relied on a search
firm’s services when they needed to fill vacancies in senior level positions. Having a
stock of knowledge of candidates who are working in the industry where the search firm
specializes in, the search firm is likely to treat these candidates differently than other
candidates who work in unfamiliar industries. It is possible that the recruiters are attuned
to catch idiosyncratic signals for the candidates that they are familiar with, hence the
more observable signals may have weaker predictive power for these candidates.
Observable characteristics of candidates include education, years of experience, years of
experience in same industry and function, the reputation of the educational institute,
reputation of the previous employer, all of which can be expected to be positively
correlated with hireability.
Although it is reasonable to assume that the search firm seeks to maintain clients’
satisfaction, legitimacy and reputation at all times, such assumption is more central to the
There is anecdotal evidence that some clients are actually relatively open about the “image” of the ideal
candidate, which includes gender, ethnicity and age range. Fernandez-Mateo and King (2011) share an
interview with a recruiter in their work where the recruiter claims that she will not take such requests (on
ethnicity) seriously.
7
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former argument where the search firm aims to predict clients’ preferences (although
without success).
We may also put this assumption to test: do the client firm and the search firm
always share the same interest? There can be at least three reasons why the interests
might differ, which haven’t yet been extensively explored in the current literature. First,
the search firm usually works with multiple clients. Because multiple searches are
processed concurrently in search firms that are bigger than a single team of recruiters, the
search firm needs to allocate resources to each of the searches. The resource could be
competent recruiters, but also the roster of candidates in their database. If a search firm
needs to allocate resources between two similar searches, it is likely that the search firm
will allocate higher-quality resources to the client that is “more important” to them, who
will possibly bring in more business in the future. This will consequently put the
comparatively less important client at a disadvantage, but it will be hard for each of the
clients to tell whether they are being provided with the best resources or not. Second,
while formally representing the client firm, search firms sometimes have vested interest
in the candidates. For example, if they have rejected the same candidate before, they are
more likely to consider the candidate more favorably in the subsequent searches
(Fernandez-Mateo & Coh, 2015). Also in this context, the candidates may become
potential clients in the future as well. Because these are high-ranked jobs, a candidate a
search firm has placed at a firm may be a key decision maker in deciding which search
firm to hire to fill their vacancies. Hence, the search firm may be motivated to
recommend someone who has built closer ties with the search firm. Third, the search firm
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may be promoting good practices that may not (yet) be the preference of the client. There
is evidence that search firms suggest hiring female board members even when the client
has not considered it in the first place (Doldor et al., 2012). In the first two cases, the
search firm may still benefit as a company and generate future revenues by strengthening
their ties with the preferred clients and candidates, which shifts the cost onto the subset of
the client firm who may end up with the second best candidates. In the third case, the
search firm may have an interest that is not necessarily financial but believes that they
can champion.
Finally, the search firm and the client firm may have different interests because of
the difference consequences for unsatisfactory outcomes. Because search firms are hired
on a contractual basis, dismissing them after the first round would be easier compared to
firing internal personnel. In other words, the threshold to fire the search committee at the
client firm is going to be lower compared to the threshold to decide to not hire the search
firm for a subsequent vacancy. Because the value of a repeat client and the business they
continue to bring is substantial, the search firm may select more conservatively compared
to the client firms, favoring the candidates who have proven records in similar jobs. If
this is indeed true, we will see a more conservative selection of search firms who are
working for clients that are bigger in size and experience frequent turnover at the top
management level. Such clients are more likely to have needs to hire search firms
compared to smaller firms or those who do not usually need to deal with frequent
turnovers. Although such variation has not yet been explored, there is empirical evidence
of search firms’ conservative selection of candidates. Using a database from a large
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multinational search firm, Hamori (2010) finds that people who were placed by search
firms were more likely to come from a similar functional background and were more
likely to move laterally compared to those who move externally without the mediation by
search firms8. She sides with Khurana’s argument that search consultants are risk-averse
and favor “defense” candidates.
As discussed above, it is possible that the search firm-mediated searches may
shape client’s selection in a way that is different from how the client would have selected
independently. Hence, I believe that it is crucial for researchers to understand the possible
differences that may exist between these two parties.

Search Firms as Brokers
The third perspective, “search firms as brokers,” focuses on the brokered nature of the
relationship that the executive search firm is part of – namely, the relationship between
the candidate, the search firm and the client firm. Executive search firms share some
commonalities with other intermediaries, or brokers, in various markets within and
outside the labor market context such as the marriage market, financial industry, and
temporary staffing agencies.
Marriage Market
Scholars have long drawn an analogy between the labor market and the marriage (i.e.,
matchmaking) market when studying search behaviors. Of course, they are also different
8

She conducts these analyses by using a stratified sample from her dataset, since the data also contains
information about the candidates who were considered but had not been interviewed for a search. I believe
that this will be a conservative test because these candidates may also have been placed by search firms
other than the focal search firm.
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in many ways. For one, an average contemporary worker will experience more employers
than marriages. People enter marital relationships with the expectation that the
relationship will be “life-long,” while contemporary workers expect to build their career
across different organizations (Bidwell & Briscoe, 2010).
I suggest that the market for senior managers, compared to the market for younger
workers, will share more similarities with the marriage market since each hiring at a
senior level will be carried out more carefully from each side of the market. From the
employer’s perspective, senior managers are more likely to have an impact on the
organization compared to younger workers. They also have longer tenure than younger
workers and command higher salaries. From the individual’s perspective, these jobs are
higher-stake, higher-powered jobs where they may stay for a longer period of time.
Hence, the role of intermediaries in the marriage market may provide insights for
its counterparts in the market for senior managers. The role of intermediaries – the
matchmakers –varies by each region and time. Ahuvia and Adelman’s (1992) SearchingMatching-Interacting (SMI) framework is useful in looking at which functions the
matchmakers are part of. Searching is the gathering of information about viable
candidates. Matching is bringing together potential partners, and interacting is further
collecting information from the match itself to decide whether to commit to the
relationship or not.
Using this framework, we are able to see how involved a matchmaker is in a
specific cultural context. For example, Tatars appoint a relative of the potential groom to
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be the matchmaker. This relative negotiates conditions for the marriage such as the
quantity and quality of the gifts that the bridegroom’s family would bring to the bride’s
family (Urazmanova, 2004). In this case, the matchmaker is playing a role in the
interaction stage. Until the first half of nineteenth-century, matchmakers in India – called
ghataks – played an important role as matchmakers, their main function being the
selection of appropriate matches (Majumdar, 2004). Because the social status was
important in this society, ghataks also functioned as genealogists who kept track of the
position of people in the caste hierarchy and determined caste ranks. Since the families
during this time hoped to maintain or improve their social status through marriage, such
expert knowledge and authority allowed them to play an important social role. In the
second half of the twentieth century, matchmaking in East Asia (e.g., Korea or Japan)
was reduced to a formal “first meeting,” in which the match the family elders introduced
their children in the hopes that they would start a courtship (Kendall, 2014). A more
comprehensive role of matchmaking can be found in commercial marriages between
Southeast Asian or mainland Chinese women and Taiwanese men. Oftentimes involving
two brokers in each local area, the brokers help all stages of searching, matching and
interacting and even help deal with issues post-marriage (Lu, 2005).
Using the SMI framework in the executive search context, search firms help the
client firm during the entire process of searching, matching and interacting. They seek
out viable candidates on behalf of the client and test out the match between the
candidates and the client firms by allowing the client firm to interview the best
candidates. The process that leads up to the client interview can be thought of as an
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integration of match and interaction. Performing the initial screening to create a shortlist
is a facilitation of matching, and the client interview gives clients an opportunity to learn
more about the candidates, which is a form of interaction. Finally, the search firm helps
them negotiate and finalize the terms.
The closest comparison between executive search firms and the marriage
matchmaking context are the commercial marriage brokers. The role of traditional
Chinese matchmakers involve the two tasks of introducing interested parties to one
another and negotiating dowry (from which the matchmaker profits from) (Jordan, 1997).
But since discussing the matchmaking fee (“the thank you money”) “contaminates” the
good-willed motivation to help create a happy marriage (Lu, 2005), the two tasks of
matching and negotiating are usually divided between two different people. Such social
aspect of matchmaking seems to play less of a role in a more commercialized setting, and
the broker who makes the match also specifies a fixed fee upfront. The fee covers the
matchmaking fee as well as the travel expenses of the matchmaking trip to Southeast
Asia (where the man meets up with the candidates and decides on whom to marry), the
bride’s trip to Taiwan, the wedding ceremony, the paperwork and the dowry. Since it is
the men who go to the agencies to seek out potential brides and usually all the expenses
are paid by the prospective groom, the groom is akin to the client firm in the search
context. Hence, the brokers usually defend the interests of the husband when conflicts
arise after the marriage. They also help the brides settle into a new environment by giving
them legal and cultural advice as well as emotional support, which is similar to the search
firms role in helping the hired executive with the onboarding process.
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A critical difference between search firms and commercial marriage brokers may
be the motivation to use them. In the case of marriage brokers, the main driver to use
them will be information – unless there are direct social ties to friends and families in
Southeast Asian countries, it will be hard to identify a pool of potential brides. Also, the
commercial brokers will not be able to provide social legitimacy as search firms would,
as commerciality could undermine the notion of “true love.”
Another trend in both the marriage and the labor market is the influence of
technological advancement. In the marriage market, intermediaries have evolved from
singles advertisement (Ahuvia & Adelman, 1992) to a more integrated, but open market
form of online dating websites where algorithms rather than human agents facilitate
searching, matching and interacting until the two parties meet offline. These services are
often provided free of charge, with premium pricing for using more functions. Such
movement into a seemingly open marketplace rather than relying on specialized agents’
expensive service (Majumdar, 2004) may imply that such platforms will diminish the
value of search firms.
Still, a critical difference between the market for senior managers and the
marriage market remains. Unlike matching in the marriage market, the market for senior
managers rarely allows for a “dating” period. This may be another reason why Internet
platforms cannot completely undermine the value of search firms. The “dating” translated
to the labor market would be most akin to summer internships for junior level jobs, where
the company decides to extend an offer after a trial period of a specified, short period of
time. Given the importance of senior manager jobs, the value of such trial period is bound
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to be higher. Instead, the employer has to place a huge bet on the new hire based on his or
her past records, and may find an expert’s help handier. Even though search firms cannot
help employers to “date” candidates, search firms can help scrutinize the candidates.
Financial industry
Intermediation theory in Finance literature has focused on transaction cost and
asymmetric information to explain the existence of financial intermediaries, such as
banks, investment banks or insurance companies (Gurley & Shaw, 1960). The argument
is that financial intermediaries exist because they reduce the cost of matching lenders and
borrowers (transaction cost), and they mitigate the problems from the asymmetry of
information because they can collect information about the borrowers more effectively
compared to individual lenders. Allen and Santomero (1997), however, noticed that a
financial industry has proliferated even with reduced transaction cost and asymmetric
information, and identified other sources of advantages that financial intermediaries
enjoy such as risk management and participation costs. The rationale for risk
management is more specific to the financial industry, but the argument with regard to
participation costs can be applied to the broader context, including the executive search
industry. Participation costs refer to knowledge about the market and the product. It is
particularly high when the market is fast changing because it requires the participants to
continuously follow the market even when they are not making any transactions. This
would be true in today’s market for executives – there is much uncertainty as to what
type of leadership can most effectively handle internal and external problems that
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organizations face. This is in line with the information argument that explains why search
firms exist.
Temporary staffing agencies
Within the labor market context, temporary staffing agencies also play a similar role,
although operating in a different market segment from the executive search firms.
Compared to temporary staffing agencies, executive search firms (1) seek out
higher ranked employees who may be less replaceable and more constrained in terms of
supply compared to the temporary workers; (2) mostly seek out candidates from their end
not vice versa, whereas staffing agencies post jobs and receive applications; (3) only
participate in the recruiting and part of the selection process (we can see some staffing
agencies finishing the entire selection process themselves and presenting a single
candidate to the client) whereas the temporary staffing agency usually remains the legal
employer until the end of the term. The first difference – that top managers are scarcer –
motivates the recruiters to maintain a good relationship with the potential candidates
regardless of whether they have been placed or not. Indeed, it may be important to take
especially good care of the rejected candidates since rejection may brew negative feelings
toward not only the client firm but also the search firm who were in charge of the process
(Fernandez-Mateo & Coh, 2015).
Despite these differences, the structural similarity between the two contexts has
yielded similar patterns in the current research. For example, Fernandez-Mateo’s work
(2007) on temporary staffing agency finds that workers receive a lower wage from the
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staffing agency for the job that they fill for a client that has built closer ties with the
agency. Taking advantage of the opaqueness in price setting, the broker gives a discount
to their important clients by cutting the wage of the workers. Similarly, a qualitative
study on search firms by Finlay and Coverdill (2000) explores the level of dependency
between the client firm and the search firm and how that affects the search firm’s level of
effort and trust. They find that the recruiters are more likely to exert effort when the fee is
higher when the client-headhunter has an exclusive relationship, and when the client is
more responsive during the search process. They also note an interesting dynamic
between the three parties, where the search firm would violate the off-limits agreement
and re-recruit the candidate from the clients with whom they have a low level of trust.
Both of these works illustrate how the broker’s tie with one of the brokered parties affects
its relationship and terms with the other party.
There is also research on embeddedness and dependency in these two contexts.
While Finlay and Coverdill (2000) explain how the headhunter becomes more vulnerable
to the client firm’s opportunism as they develop more social ties with them, Bidwell and
Fernandez-Mateo (2010) demonstrate how the embeddedness (measured by the
relationship duration) between the employee and the staffing agency allows the staffing
agency to capture more value from its brokering role.
The former case is another illustration of Uzzi’s “paradox of embeddedness”
(1997) where the increased dependency from an embedded relationship leads to a larger
loss should one party behave opportunistically. In their qualitative study, they show how
some recruiters at contingent search firms did experience such “betrayal” from the client
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with whom they have worked exclusively on a search, where the client hired a candidate
from another search firm. They also present cases where the client firm actively tries to
cut the fee by emphasizing their close relationship. The consultants are often offended by
such requests because it not only reduces the earnings but take it as an undervaluation of
their work. Such interpretation is an interesting juxtaposition to Fernandez-Mateo’s work
(2007) where the broker initiates the discount in order to reward and retain their valued
clients.
The second case – in the work by Bidwell and Fernandez-Mateo (2010) – shows
how the staffing firm is able to use the accumulated information from a close relationship
to make a better match between the client firm and the worker. Using this informational
advantage to its bargaining power with the workers, they are able to charge a higher price
and take a higher proportion of the price as a fee. The asymmetry in terms of bargaining
power, they argue, comes from the fact that workers can only maintain close relationships
with one or two brokers while the brokers are able to form multiple relationships with
workers. Since workers are more replaceable than brokers are to workers, the brokers are
able to maintain their bargaining power. In Finlay and Coverdill’s work (2000) brokers
are more replaceable than clients are to brokers, hence, the client maintains its bargaining
power. All of this research suggests that the “weaker” party pays the price of forming a
close relationship with the “stronger” party. Note that Finlay and Coverdill’s context is in
contingent search – in the context of retained search, once an exclusive contract is signed,
the search firm is not as replaceable at least for the duration of that specific search. Yet, I
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believe that we will be able to see similar dynamics in the negotiations prior to signing an
exclusive deal.
SUMMARY
In this chapter, I introduced executive search firms and why it is important to study them.
By categorizing the current literature in three perspectives – search firms as windows,
gatekeepers, and brokers –, we are able to identify the gaps for future research more
easily.
The windows approach uses search firms as a context to deduce generalizable
insights with regard to executive selections and careers. For example, studies have
investigated how “fit” matters in selection, and when people are likely to accept an
outside solicitation for a new employment opportunity. There is much more to be studied
using this approach, such as how prior career history impacts the success of career
transition. This is the questions that I explore in Chapter 2 of my dissertation;
specifically, I look at how the frequency of inter-employer moves and current tenure
impact the attractiveness of the candidate when they are considered for a new executive
job.
The gatekeepers approach investigates the differences between the selection
between search firm and the client firm, to understand whether search firms give or
restrict access to candidates in certain gender or ethnicity groups. Previous research has
found that search firms favor the already privileged candidates who are white male, and
those who work at prestigious companies. Recent studies though found conflicting
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evidence on whether or not female are disadvantaged when search firms facilitate the
process. I believe that such controversy can be effectively addressed by studying more in
depth the source of differences. Is it the inaccurate assumption about the client’s
preferences, or is it the difference in specialized knowledge? Do search firms indeed
select more conservatively compared to client firms because of the value of future
businesses with them? Do search firms hold different interest because of their
relationship with other clients or important candidates? It will be important to answer
these questions as well as study the outcomes for different groups of candidates. In
Chapter 3, I explore one possible mechanism through which gender-based selection is
prompted by measuring client firm’s preferences for candidate attributes from candidate
requirements in job descriptions.
Lastly, the search firm as brokers approach focuses on the dynamics between
different parties involved in this market. For example, researchers have studied how
embeddedness and dependency affect the broker’s relationships with clients and
individuals. We are able to identify similarities and differences with intermediaries in
other markets such as financial services firms, matchmakers in the marriage market and
temporary staffing agencies. Chapter 4 in this dissertation follows this line of approach
by bringing in the thus far unexplored “fourth” actor in this context: the firm that
experiences employee departure as a result of the search. Specifically, I study the client
tie formation between this firm and the search firm.
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CHAPTER 2: PRIOR CAREER MOBILITY AS A MIXED SIGNAL IN THE
MARKET FOR SENIOR MANAGERS

Introduction
The rate of mobility of workers between employers has increased dramatically
over the past few decades (Cappelli, 1999; Farber, 1999; 2008). Between 1975 and 2000,
the rate of transition between employers increased by more than 50% (Stewart, 2002).
Despite the rise in mobility and the emergence of boundaryless careers (Arthur, 2014),
however, the term job-hopping still retains at least some of its historically negative
connotation. This poses a dilemma for workers who, having been tasked with taking
control of their own careers (Cappelli, 2008), must think strategically about which
opportunities to pursue and when. On the one hand, mobility might be seen as a positive
signal by potential employers, indicating the acquisition of a broad range of experience
and the ability to quickly adapt to new organizational cultures, both of which are
particularly valued in the labor market for senior executives. On the other hand, it may be
perceived as indicative of a worker’s propensity to job hop, signaling that prospective
employers should be wary of hiring a worker who is likely to leave as soon as a slightly
better opportunity presents itself. This confusion is reflected in the contradictory advice
regularly provided in the popular press, where one might read “you should avoid jumping
around if you can” (Gallo, 2015) just after being told “don’t let yourself become stagnant
where you are” (Issid, n.d.). For scholars, this raises an interesting yet largely unexplored
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set of questions around whether and how a worker’s previous mobility shapes their
marketability, and, ultimately, their chances of being offered a job they are interested in.
Though previous work has examined how job history in the past predicts worker
behavior in the subsequent job such as voluntary turnover or organizational commitment
(Barrick & Zimmerman, 2005; Cascio, 1976), there is a dearth of empirical evidence on
how prior mobility impacts a candidate’s attractiveness to potential employers. It is
important to understand how employers interpret the signals provided by a candidate’s
career history and how this shapes the opportunities available to different workers, a
difference which ultimately shapes the unequal distribution of income and other social
outcomes (Granovetter, 1981). Understanding how the market values previous career
mobility also promises to enable firms to employ better hiring and retention strategies,
and allow workers to effectively craft their portfolio of careers.
The paucity of the work that directly studies the relationship between mobility
and hiring chances in the labor market is a direct result of the challenges associated with
studying the potential opportunities available to workers. The question of “attractiveness”
or “marketability” of a worker is essentially about the preferences and perceptions of
employers: what kind of characteristics and track records do employers perceive as
valuable and increase the chance of the candidate getting selected by the employer?
Research to date which relied primarily on “post-hiring” data, showing which workers
end up in which jobs, has only limited capacity for studying this question because it
reflects the choices of both the employer and the worker. For example, if we see more
CEOs with short spells of employment from previous jobs, is it because employers prefer
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such career history, or because applicants who have stayed in one place for a while are
less likely to apply or accept outside job offers?
One way to explicitly examine the preferences of employers is to directly observe
their decision-making at the time of hiring (Fernandez & Sosa, 2005). I take such an
approach in this paper, using a unique dataset on the selection of senior managers from an
executive search firm. The data contain the entire set of candidates considered by an
employer for a job offer, allowing me to examine which characteristics of candidates—in
this case career mobility—increase the likelihood of being offered a job. Because the
consideration set is restricted to candidates who have opted into the consideration set for
the said vacancy, the result of the process (whether they receive an offer or not) can be
solely attributed to the decision making from the employer side.
In this study, I look at two measures of career mobility: the relative frequency of
employer changes and tenure at the current firm. Each measure captures a different
aspect of career mobility and explores a distinct mechanism through which that mobility
can affect workers’ attractiveness in the external labor market. I hypothesize that the
relative frequency of employer change allows employees to build diverse experiences,
which can positively impact the worker’s attractiveness. Frequently changing employers
without building diverse experience, however, would signal that the worker might be a
serial job hopper. Tenure at the current firm allows one to demonstrate their competence
and be promoted internally, which is a salient signal of competence for outside
employers. Yet, staying with an employer for too long could also make outside
employers wary about the cultural adaptability of the new hire, whose person-
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organization misfit during the adjustment period would create additional cost for the
hiring firm.
Empirically, I find support for the proposed contrasting effects of the frequency of
employer change. On the one hand, a high level of frequency of employer change
increases the functional diversity of a workers’ background, which increased the
likelihood of their receiving an offer. On the other hand, the frequency of employer
change decreases the likelihood, given that the level of functional diversity is the same.
The pattern is similar for the effect of tenure at the current firm. Long tenure at the firm is
positively associated with the number of jobs held at the firm, which increased the
likelihood of receiving an offer, but the long tenure decreased the likelihood of receiving
an offer once the number of jobs is controlled for. These results suggest that qualitative
differences exist among similar patterns of career mobility, which bring different
outcomes for workers. When people change employers, they may switch to a job that is
similar or different from their old job at the previous employer; when people stay with
the same employer, some move internally while others don't. In this paper, I take into
account these differences in order to understand better the mechanisms through which
career mobility affects their chances in the external labor market.
This paper contributes to our understanding of the market for senior managers in
the context of boundaryless careers and has important implications for workers and firms.
From the firms’ perspective, these results suggest that firms must adjust their hiring and
retention strategies to reflect the market value of the workers with different mobility
signals. For example, they must understand that people who have not moved across
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employers as often may also be highly coveted by other firms, and may need to be
compensated accordingly. As their employees lose marketability with tenure, the firms
need to think of ways to retain some of their best workers by offering them better career
prospect within the company, or continue to attract high-quality workers by providing
them with promising exit options.
Also, this work adds to the strategic human capital literature which seeks to
generate competitive advantage from the human capital by restricting negotiating power
from employees that arises from the fact that they can freely move to other firms (B. A.
Campbell, Coff, & Kryscynski, 2012; Coff, 1997). This stream of work mainly focused
on how to retain workers after hiring them, but this paper suggests a novel mechanism
through which employers can reduce the probability of employee mobility: screening
employees prior to hiring.
From workers’ perspective, the results suggest that employees are faced with a
tradeoff when moving between employers. By moving to a different employer, they are
able to reset the “inflexibility clock” and mitigate concerns about the lack of flexibility
and adaptability. We also know from the previous literature that oftentimes moving is
accompanied with a salary bump (Bidwell, 2011). At the same time, however, an
additional record of mobility increases the perceived propensity to job hop. Hence, each
move must be carefully planned out, after considering all of the associated costs and
benefits.
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Theory and Hypotheses
Shift in the employer-employee relationship
The pattern of employee relationships has experienced a drastic change since the early
1980s. Firms are increasingly hiring experienced workers, and the average tenure of
employees has decreased significantly (Cappelli, 1999). As workers have begun to build
careers across organizations rather than within (Bidwell & Briscoe, 2010; O'Mahony &
Bechky, 2006), they have regarded different firms as “stepping stones” to achieve their
ultimate career goals, be it a high level of pay, high level of autonomy, intrinsically
interesting job, or senior-level position. As a result, the relationship between employees
and employers has become more transactional in nature: in addition to compensation,
employees work for an employer for a period of time in exchange for skills and signals
that they could use to move to other employers (Bidwell, Won, Barbulescu, & Mollick,
2015).
As workers increasingly expect to move across employers, the notion of
“marketability” (in the labor market) has gained importance. Traditionally, when workers
stayed at a single employer throughout their entire career, the issue of marketability only
mattered when the worker first entered the labor market. Workers would signal their
competency and quality through educational credentials or other evidence of training
such as internships or professional certificates (Spence, 1973). Now, however, as
experienced workers have become increasingly mobile, the question of marketability
applies to a broader set of labor market participants. Also, compared to entry-level hiring,
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the potential employer now has more information with regard to the worker’s career
history.
An important part of the information available to employers is the mobility history
of potential hires, specifically the number of jobs and tenure at those jobs. These two
measures from a worker’s career history –frequency of employer change and tenure at the
current employer – each signal mixed effects. For example, the relative frequency of
employer change, on the one hand, functions as a signal for a serial job-hopping
tendency, where high frequency is interpreted as possessing a high level of such
tendency, while on the other hand, moving between employers enables workers to build
diverse experience which is valued in senior management positions. As for tenure, long
tenure at the current firm, on the one hand, provides an opportunity to prove competency
to outside firms via internal promotion, but on the other hand, long tenure may imply a
lack of cultural flexibility. Thus, the effect of career mobility emerges only when taking
into account these potentially mediating effects, depicted in Figure 2.1.

Frequency of employer change as an enabler of diverse experience
A worker that frequently moves may have accumulated broader experiences across
organizations as a result of having worked for multiple employers. An important aspect
of this broader experience is increased functional diversity. Research has shown that
workers are more likely to change functional areas when moving between employers
(Bidwell & Mollick, 2015). Because smaller companies have only so many functions,
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switching between employers is sometimes the only way to be exposed to other
functional roles.
There are many reasons to believe that this exposure to different functions could
heighten flexibility and bring more novel, fresher perspectives to the new organization.
Crossland and his colleagues (2014) showed that CEOs with a high level of career variety
direct the firm towards novel strategic initiatives. Oftentimes the reason behind hiring a
new executive is associated with the desire for changing around the organization, and
these organizations would covet a candidate with a mobile career history, provided that
career history included a diverse functional background.
Even though the literature has not yet come to a consensus about whether a
diverse functional background is harmful or beneficial to workers’ career outcomes9,
there is a reason to believe that a diverse career, especially diversity in terms of
functional experience, may be more useful for senior level jobs. Senior jobs require more
coordination and communication across the organization compared to lower level jobs
(Mintzberg, 1973; Watkins, 2013). Having a first-hand experience in different functional
roles will allow senior managers to be effective communicator and broker, with a better
understanding of different challenges that each unit faces, and knowledge of the
“language” and the norms in different functions. Relatedly, Kleinbaum (2012) has shown
that people with diverse career backgrounds are more likely to occupy brokerage position
For example, a stream of literature suggest that diverse career broadens and deepens worker’s human
capital (Wexley, Latham, Kettering, Rivaldo, & Christensen, 1991) and social capital (Corredoira &
Rosenkopf, 2010; Gulati & Puranam, 2009; Kleinbaum & Stuart, 2014), while another stream highlights
the disadvantage of diversifying the career because of weak signal of competence from not having a clear
identity according to social categorization theory (Leung & Sharkey, 2013) and lack of skill accumulation
in a particular area (Ferguson & Hasan, 2013).
9

50
in firms. Given that the senior managers are often expected to perform the role of broker
within the company, they will likely be more effective when they have a diverse
background. Although Kleinbaum was agnostic about the type of diversity in his study,
other works suggest that the ability to bridge between different functions within the firm
will be particularly valuable.
Based on these arguments, I expect that the diversity of functional experience will
be positively correlated with the probability of receiving an offer, and the positive effect
of mobility will be mediated by the functional diversity of the experience.
H1. The frequency of employer change will have a positive, indirect effect on the
probability of receiving an offer through its effect on the diversity of functional
experience.

Frequency of employer change as a signal of serial job hopper
Although having moved frequently between employers may bring benefits via increased
diversity of experience, it may also bring negative consequences for workers as a signal
of a serial job hopper.
Managing turnover is an issue in many organizations. When voluntary turnover
occurs, the firm needs to expend resources to search within and outside the organization
to fill the vacancy and train the new employee (Cascio, 1991). Turnover may also result
in the loss of relationships with key clients (Broschak, 2004) and the flow of knowledge
and social capital to competitors (Somaya, Williamson, & Lorinkova, 2008).
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Because of such retention concerns, employers can become leery when they see
that a candidate has moved frequently across firms, suspecting that the potential
employee may not stick around for long. Two sets of arguments in the existing literature
suggest that people who frequently change employers would be inclined to leave the new
employer more quickly than others. The first set of arguments suggests that job-hopping
tendency is dispositional. A line of work has suggested that certain individuals have a
higher tendency to move because of enduring traits such as personality or cognitive
ability (Boudreau, Boswell, Judge, & Bretz, 2001; Judge & Watanabe, 1995). The second
set of arguments suggests causality between prior employer change and turnover.
Research has shown that job-hopping increases the probability of job-hopping in the later
period by reducing the continuance organizational commitment, which is a type of
commitment that arises when one fears a lack of outside options (Kondratuk, Hausdorf,
Korabik, & Rosin, 2004) . In another study, Lee and Mitchell (1994) suggests in their
“unfolding” model of turnover, that people who have previously moved between
employers acquire certain skills related to mobility that enable them to more easily move
between jobs. Whether it is dispositional or path-dependent or learning-based, all of these
arguments suggest that a history of job hopping will signal the likelihood of repeated jobhopping behavior in the future. Another concern that employers may have about a
candidate with a record of frequent moves between employers is with regard to her
competency that those mobility events may have resulted from dismissals due to
performance issues. Previous research on “lemons” in the labor market has shown that
workers who were dismissed due to plant closings will not suffer from lower wage in
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subsequent jobs compared to those who were laid off (Gibbons & Katz, 1991). Their
argument is that when the firm has the discretion to dismiss their workers they choose to
lay off people who are of lower quality (the “lemons”) while compensating the highquality workers at the market wage. There are many reasons beyond performance issues
that prompt people to move to a new employer, such as being presented with a new
opportunity. However, the employers may still worry that the previous moves were due
to concerns about performance, and hold a conservative stance, further reducing the
attractiveness of those who have moved jobs repeatedly. As a result, firms may be wary
of hiring a candidate who has frequently changed employers in the past, leading me to
hypothesize that:
H2. When the diversity of experience is controlled for, the frequency of employer
change negatively affects the likelihood of receiving an offer.
Tenure at current employer as an opportunity to prove competency
The second aspect of candidates’ careers that firms will pay particular attention to is their
tenure at the current firm. There are reasons to believe that the tenure at the current firm
will be another piece of information that is distinct from the frequency of employer
change. Mobility events prior to the current job are more ambiguous in terms of the cause
of move, especially regarding whether it was voluntary or not. As for the current
employment, however, the candidate has not left the firm yet, and hence, the “opting to
move” can be attributed more to the worker’s choice rather than the employer’s decision
to terminate the worker. Also, the current job is likely to be more similar to the vacant
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position at hand compared to past jobs, making the record more relevant compared to the
previous history.
A benefit of staying with an employer is that it provides the opportunity for
workers to prove their competency to outside employers. Previous research shows that
internal promotion works as a positive signal for competency in the labor market
(DeVaro & Waldman, 2012; Waldman, 1984). It is hard for outside firms to observe
employee performance, but information on promotion is oftentimes made public through
the change in job titles that a company posts on its website or through people’s personal
pages on platforms such as LinkedIn.
The assumption behind the “promotion signal” is that the job assignments are
mostly merit-based. Under such a design, it takes time for any employee to demonstrate
her competency to the employer in order to be considered for promotion. In most firms,
employees usually stay two to three years in the same position to prove their competency
on the job before moving up the ladder and gaining a higher degree of responsibility.
Oftentimes, it also takes time for vacancies to open up internally. Hence, a certain
number of years at a firm is naturally a necessary, though not sufficient, condition to be
promoted internally, so the positive effect of tenure on the probability of receiving an
offer will be mediated by internal promotions.
H3. Duration of employment at the current employer will have a positive, indirect
effect on the probability of receiving an offer through its effect on the number of
internal promotions.
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Tenure at current employment as a signal for cultural inflexibility
While tenure can increase the future prospect for workers via internal promotions, long
tenure can also signal cultural inflexibility. The notion of cultural flexibility has played
little role in studies on career diversity that focused on internal moves (Ferguson &
Hasan, 2013) or freelancers who are not bound by organizational boundaries (e.g., Leung,
2014), but it is likely to be important for organizations engaging in external hiring. Each
firm has unique routines, processes, and norms that guide employees on how to carry out
their tasks (Schein, 2010). These norms also help the organization function smoothly
without micro-synchronizing and coordinating every decision and choice each member
makes.
How well new hires adapt to the new norms is likely to be a critical determinant
of their effectiveness. In particular, new hires who are culturally flexible will adapt to the
hiring organization’s culture more quickly. This, in turn, will minimize the cost
associated with the person-environment misfit during the adjustment period for the hiring
firm. The cultural misalignment that persists during the period of adaptation may hinder
worker performance and effective coordination between the new hire and other parts of
the hiring company (Dokko, Wilk, & Rothbard, 2009). The issue of adaptation may be
particularly important for senior managers because cultural misalignment is also likely to
cause confusion for their subordinates. This will force subordinates to straddle two
“bosses” with different expectations about how to approach and tackle tasks. This may
induce cultural misalignment for the subordinates, which could lead to not only poor
performance but also voluntary turnover (Chatman, 1991).

55
Given such importance of cultural flexibility, long tenure could induce rigidity for
workers. As workers become more deeply embedded into the firm’s culture, they are
more likely to internalize the practices and more importantly, the underlying
assumptions. This will make it difficult to adapt and be enculturated to a new culture after
the move, which would be a concern for employers. Hence, I hypothesize that:
H4. When the number of internal promotion is controlled for, the duration of
employment at current employer negatively affects the likelihood of receiving an
offer.

Figure 2.1 provides an overview of the relationship that I propose to test in this
paper.
-- Insert Figure 2.1 here --

Data and Method
I test my hypotheses using data from a mid-sized executive search firm headquartered in
the US, which I call SearchCo. Previous studies have acknowledged the usefulness of
search firms for understanding the workings of the executive labor market. For example,
Cappelli and Hamori (2013) took advantage of the fact that search firms take the
initiative to scout out potential candidates in order to examine the factors that prompt
executives to consider exploring different job options. Fernandez-Mateo and Coh (2015)
studied how the past interactions between the candidate and the search firm influenced
their decisions in the later period. Both of the studies made use of the process data that
identifies the candidates who make it through to the each round of selection. Because the
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data also contains candidates who do not proceed to the next round, the researchers were
able to understand the determinants of selection at each round. This paper takes
advantage of this feature of the search firm data, while additionally also making use of
the detailed career history data of each candidate, which previous studies did not have
access to.

Data
The dataset consists of all search records between 2005 and 2012, with the list of
candidates who were considered (mean size of the pool per search = 180.94), contacted
(149.89), interviewed by the search firm (9.74), interviewed by the client firm (4.93),
offered the job (1.04), and ultimately, accepted the job (1). The process is depicted in
Figure 2.2. Across those 8 years, the firm conducted 682 searches, among which 491
were successfully completed. Hence, the firm completed about 60 searches per year on
average during this period of time. In addition to for-profit companies in a variety of
industries, SearchCo’s clients also include several universities, hospitals and non-profit
organizations, which together account for about half of their business, enhancing the
generalizability of the results across both industries and business models.
I combine this filtering data with the data from resumes from SearchCo’s server,
from which I extracted information about the candidate’s educational and professional
history. The educational history includes the name of the institution, type of degree and
the year of degree received; the professional history contains information on the name of
the employer, the job title, and the start year and end year of each of the job spells. It was
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common for people to have held more than one job at the same employer. Undergraduate
research assistants were hired and trained to parse the information with me from the
resumes into spreadsheets. A hypothetical example of this process is depicted in Figure
2.3.

Dependent variable: Receiving an offer
The focus of this study is to understand who received an offer from the client,
among those who were considered by them.
The limitation of this data is that it can be difficult to know exactly which party
withdrew from proceeding to the next round of selection. If a candidate does not appear
in the list of candidates considered for the subsequent round, it is possible that the
recruiter did not select the candidate, but it is also possible that the candidate withdrew
from proceeding further. The last step of the selection process does not suffer from this
problem, however, because the withdrawal from the candidate side can be identified by
those who received an offer but did not move to the client firm. Also, because being part
of the process requires time and energy, and increasingly so with the higher rounds, the
proportion of serious candidates is higher in the later round. Moreover, it reflects badly
on the search firm when the candidate receives an offer and then rescinds, so they try to
make sure that people on the final slate are highly interested in taking the offer (Khurana,
2002). Indeed, the rate of declining the offer is very low, at about 3.8% in my dataset.
Previous studies (Fernandez-Mateo & Coh, 2015) on headhunters also suggest likewise,
that the filtering that happens in the final round is almost always initiated by the
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evaluator. Hence, I restrict the sample to the last step of the selection process, where there
is the least amount of ambiguity in terms of which party withdrew. Nevertheless, I report
the selection in the previous stage (see Table 3) for comparison. This stage is conducted
by the recruiters from the SearchCo.

Independent variables
Relative frequency of job change. Because rates of mobility vary non-linearly
with experience, measures such as an average number of employer per year are
problematic for comparing across workers with different levels of experience. Such an
average measure would assign the same value for workers who have worked at 2
different employers across 5 years, and 4 different employers throughout 10 years. Yet,
the literature suggests that it is more common for young workers to move jobs than older
workers (Topel & Ward, 1992).
Hence, I use an inductive approach to operationalize this construct by comparing
the frequency of job change within each experience cohort. The variable relative
frequency of job change was calculated by first counting the number of employers that
the candidate has worked for at each year of experience. For example, if a candidate
moved to another employer in year 3, the unique number of employers will be 1 at year 1,
1 at year 2 and 2 in year 3. After calculating, I compared the mobility of all candidates at
each year of experiences and assigned a z-score to each person-year observation in terms
of where they stand in the distribution of the number of employers for each year. Then, I
took z-score from the final year (at the time a client extended an offer) for each
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candidate. This z-score, therefore, represents the relative level of mobility compared to
other workers with the same level of experience. This is the mobility measure that I use
for my analyses. Note that this approach utilizes each of the yearly data from the career
history of each individual, making the comparison group much richer and stronger.
Functional diversity. In order to calculate functional diversity, I coded the
functions using the job titles for each of the jobs each candidate held10. Then, I counted
the unique number of functional areas that the candidate had worked at in each year of
experience and again assigned a z-score to each person-year observation in terms of
where they stand in the distribution. Finally, I took the z-score from the last year and
assigned it to be the measure of functional diversity, as I did with the mobility measure.
Tenure at current employer. The variable was calculated using the start year of
the employment spell at the currently employed firm, and subtracting it from the start
year of the search.
The number of jobs held at the currently employed firm. This is a count variable,
indicating the number of distinct jobs that candidates have held at their current employer.
When controlling for the number of functions held at the current firm, this variable
provides a conservative estimate of the number of internal promotions the candidate has
experienced within their current firm. Even before using such control, the number of jobs

10

The functions were categorized into top management, IT, finance, administrative, marketing, HR,
operations, general management, sales, engineering, consulting, research, clinical, nursing, legal,
communications, manufacturing, quality control, student affairs, fundraising, corporate development,
strategy, and board membership. These categories of functional areas were identified initially from
SearchCo’s internal rubric, and were adjusted using external sources.
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held is a close enough measure of internal promotions because most internal moves are
promotions (Bidwell & Mollick, 2015).

Control variables
Gender. Gender was coded from candidates’ first name using an API called
genderize11, which utilizes a database that collects data on name and gender using various
social networking platforms. Genderize provides the probability that the name will be
either female or male, and the variable female that I use in the analyses is coded as 1 if
the probability of the name being female is higher. For gender-neutral names and names
that are not in the database, the variable was hand-coded from photographs on LinkedIn
accounts and internal materials that revealed the gender of the candidates from the usage
of pronouns.
Education. A dummy variable was created for each of the post-baccalaureate
degrees that the candidates may have earned, such as MBA, JD, MD, Ph.D., LLM, and
MD.
Years of experience. The years of experience were estimated using the starting
year of the first job on the resume, and subtracting it from the year of the search. Then,
any gap in the employment was subtracted from this value. A caveat to this approach in
that the first job listed on the resume may not actually be the first job that they took in the
labor market. I use this as a rough proxy for gauging the total years of experience.

11

This database is accessible at https://genderize.io/.
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Status. Using the names of the companies that candidates have worked at, I coded
whether the current employer is a highly recognizable firm. Names of the firms were
matched with the list of Fortune 100 firms, US News Ranking for colleges and hospitals.
The dummy variable was given a value of 1 if it appears in the list of Fortune 100
companies from the year 2006 to the year 2012; if it is in the Top 50 from U.S. News &
World Report rankings of universities from the year 1991 to the year 2001; or if it is in
the top 10 for any of the 16 specialty areas from the U.S. News & World Report
Hospitals rankings from the year 1996 and 2002. Each of the ranking data was chosen to
most closely match the time frame of the data at hand, given availability.
Rank. Because hierarchical rank in organization may be correlated with how long
people have stayed in the firm (e.g., lower ranked people are likely to have shorter tenure
at the company, because some of the higher ranked people would have been promoted
internally) and their likelihood of getting selected (e.g., lower ranked people are less
likely to get selected), I control for the rank at the time of hiring. I categorized the ranks
into the following buckets by using the job titles: CEO (0.41%), C-level job (CFO, COO,
president, founder, partner, chief, owner) (16.18%), senior vice president and executive
vice president (6.16%), vice president (17.47%), director (27.44%), associate director
(1.12%), manager (9.24%) and other. This measure was included as a categorical variable
in my analyses.
The similarity with the vacancy. I measured the fit with the vacancy in terms of
three dimensions: industry, function and rank. Because the vacant position also comes
with those three dimensions (industry area of the client company, the functional area and
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the rank of the job), these dimensions were matched and were also coded using the same
strategy explained above. The similarity in terms of industry and function was set to 1 if
it matches that of the vacancy. In the case of rank, I coded whether the current position
was the same rank (lateral), lower rank (promotion) or higher rank (demotion) compared
to the vacancy.
Erraticism. The measure of erraticism (Leung, 2014) was controlled for to
account for the fact that some functions are closer to each other than others. Following
Leung (2014)’s construction of the variable in his paper, first I calculated the similarity
between function i to function j by dividing the numbers of co-occurrence of i and j (the
number of the pairs of functional experiences that appeared within a candidate’s job
history across the entire sample of candidates), divided by the number of occurrences of
function i. The distance between functions was calculated by subtracting the similarity
measure from 1. Then, erraticism of the worker was calculated by taking the total
distance between functions divided by a total number of moves, less one.

Analysis and Results
I used conditional logit to estimate the probability of receiving an offer as a
function of employment duration and individual characteristics, grouped at each of the
vacancies. Because the dependent variable is dichotomous, logit model takes account of
the fact that the likelihood of receiving an offer must fall between 0 and 1. As an
equivalent of fixed effects model, conditional logit model allows me to compare the
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selection within each of the considered set for each vacancy. Hence, I do not include the
controls that are specific to each vacancy.
Table 2.1 provides means, standard deviations, and correlations for the main
dependent and independent variables in my analyses. The two measures of career
mobility—frequency of employer change and tenure in current company—capture
distinct yet related aspects of a candidate’s career history. As expected, the frequency of
employer change is negatively correlated with the current tenure at the firm (r=-0.44).
Table 2.2 explores the relationship between the main independent variables and
the mediating variables, showing the results from ordinary least squares model on
functional diversity and number of positions respectively, additionally controlling for
gender, experience, the position at current employer and education. In Model 1, I find
that the frequency of employer change is positively correlated with functional diversity
(β=0.487). The mobile people who are two standard deviations above the mean have on
average one standard deviation above the mean in terms of functional diversity. In Model
2, I find that tenure at the current firm is positively correlated with the number of jobs
held (β =0.163), which is a proxy for internal promotion. This means that staying at an
employer for approximately 6 years will amount to one promotion for an average
employee. Each of these results satisfies the first prerequisite for being a potential
mediating variable hypothesized in H1 and H3 respectively.
Table 2.3 tests the effect of career mobility on the likelihood of receiving an offer
using conditional logit. In Model 1, we see that the effect of frequency of employer
change is positive but not statistically significant (β=-0.0763). As we control for
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functional diversity, however, the effect of mobility becomes significantly negative in
Model 2, where each standard deviation above the mean in terms of mobility decreases
the odds of receiving an offer by 20.1%. This is consistent with what we would expect if
H1 were to hold. Functional diversity is positively associated with the probability of
receiving an offer, lending support to the idea that the effect of mobility is mediated by
the positive effect of functional diversity.
To formally test whether the mediating effect is significant, Baron and Kenny’s
dated approach (1986) is not appropriate in this setting especially because it requires total
effect to exist between two variables12. As Zhao et al. (2010) notes, however, a mediation
effect can exist without a significant total effect, when the indirect effect and the direct
effect have opposite signs which is the case in this paper. Following this logic, mediation
effect exists whenever the indirect effect a x b is significant. When entered into
bootstrapping mediation tests (Preacher & Hayes, 2008) based on 5000 bootstrap samples,
I find that functional diversity (estimate = 0.015, bias-corrected 95% confidence interval
= [0.004, 0.025]) is a significant mediator of the effect of frequency of employer change.
The remaining direct effect is negative, which explains why the total effect is not
significant.
Model 3 in Table 2.3 tests the effect of tenure at the current employment on the
probability of receiving an offer. The coefficient is positive (β=0.00959), but is not
significant at the 95% significance level. In Model 4, the number of positions in current

The Sobel test for mediation (1982), which is frequently used as a supplement to Baron and Kenny
approach has also been found to be flawed because of the strong assumption that the sampling distribution
of the indirect effect is normal, when it tends to be asymmetric.
12
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company is added. The number of jobs held at the current firm has a positive effect on the
likelihood of receiving an offer, where each promotion increases the odds of receiving an
offer by 16.6%. The result is consistent (though not reported here – available upon
request) when additionally controlling for the number of unique functional roles that
people held at the current company. When the number of positions in current company is
included, the sign of the coefficient flips to negative (β=-0.0316), suggesting mediated
effect by the number of positions. Again using 5000 bootstrap samples, I find that the
number of positions held in the current firm (estimate = 0.004, bias-corrected 95%
confidence interval = [0.001, 0.006]) is a significant mediator of the current tenure. This
supports H3, the mediation hypothesis, but not H4, which suggested that the current
tenure will negatively affect the probability of receiving an offer.
Model 5 combines all the variables of interest in the same model. Note that
because the frequency of employer change and current tenure are highly correlated, the
standard error is enlarged because of the multicollinearity. However, the directionality
and the magnitude is comparable to the previous models. The size of the coefficient in
Model 5 suggests that less mobile candidates with the frequency of employer change that
is one z-score below the mean are about 1.25 times more likely to be selected compared
to those with an average level of frequency of employer change.
Model 6 explores the possibility that the functional form of current tenure may be
nonlinear. Allowing for different slopes before and after a cut-off (spline at year 3 is
reported here, but the pattern of results are consistent with splines at year 2 and 4), we see
that the negative effect of current tenure becomes significant after the cut-off point,
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implying that the longer tenure is only penalizing in the later phase, where each
additional tenure reduces the odds of receiving an offer by 5%. This is sensible because
the concerns about cultural flexibility will be more severe when the worker has worked at
one company for a prolonged period of time.

Discussion
In his interviews with hiring managers, Bills (1990) found that job history – the
most important component of which being the record of job hopping – is the second most
important information that recruiters take into account, following experience, which itself
is an aspect of job history. Despite its importance in how workers are valued in the
external labor market where the evaluators have limited amount of information
(Greenwald, 1986; Waldman, 1984), the effect of career mobility hasn’t received a closer
look thus far. The results from my analyses lend support to the idea that, at least in the
market for senior managers, career mobility is a mixed signal. Although one might expect
that the newly emerged notion of the boundaryless career may have led hiring managers
to become more forgiving towards job hoppers, there is still reason to believe that
possessing such a job record remains a red flag for employers, unless such hopping
clearly reveals the acquisition of diverse functional experiences. Then again, and
somewhat paradoxically, my findings show that staying with one firm for a prolonged
period of time without moving internally is also associated with a lower probability of
receiving an offer. I suggest that this effect most likely reflects that it creates cultural
inflexibility.
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I suggest in this paper that what we may call “worker loyalty” is still valued in the
modern labor market. Increased labor flexibility has freed firms from the responsibility of
training all of their employees from the entry level and allowed them to more easily shed
the existing workforce in times of change and turmoil, but it has also reduced their ability
to retain their best or most marketable talent. In fact, the issue of employee retention has
become ever more critical in the new era since worker loyalty has become a scarcer good,
and employers are continuing to expect their employees to be loyal to them (Slay &
Taylor, 2007). I suggest that such expectation and desire is manifested in how they hire.
The results from my study support the anecdotal evidence that employers are indeed wary
about hiring job-hoppers, especially when the worker has not accumulated diverse
experience out of such moves.
At the level of top managers, candidates are rarely unemployed at the time of
hiring, which makes the search for loyalty somewhat paradoxical in that a new hire has to
be disloyal to their prior employer. Hence, the most coveted worker in terms of loyalty
will not consider entering a new match (or it will be costly to persuade this loyal worker),
and the most willing worker may be doubted for lack of loyalty. My results suggest that
firms compromise and choose the candidate who seems to be the most loyal amongst the
people who are disloyal enough to move. Specifically, I show that workers with a high
level of mobility compared to their peers are less coveted by outside employers.
The results around the tenure at the current employer and the probability of
receiving an offer imply a certain level of misalignment of goals between firms and
workers regarding the optimal duration of employment, especially within firms with
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flatter organizational structure. The longer the worker stay without moving upward, she
becomes less attractive in the market. This may motivate her to move out, which is going
to be costly for the firm. Hence, the firm will need to compensate for such loss in the
market value for workers with longer tenure, and this may be an alternative explanation
for seniority-based pay. Encouraging lateral moves between functions within a company
may also be a strategy that firms can use. Such strategy would eventually make
employees more attractive to outside employers, but will help firms suppress pay while
the employee accumulates experiences internally. This is in line with previous work that
demonstrated how high status firms are able to attract high-quality workers by giving
them an attractive exit option (Bidwell et al., 2015). The benefit from such strategy is
more likely to be higher in contexts where job-hoppers are penalized more severely.
A limitation of this study in terms of making a causal statement about my findings
is that the recruiter has more information about the candidate other than what is listed on
their CVs. For example, a recruiter may be able to infer additional competency signals
from interviews. If it is the case that less competent candidates tend to have moved
between employers more often, the negative relationship between the frequency of
employer change and the probability of receiving an offer may be spurious. Controlling
for current job rank in the current analyses allows me to mitigate some of the concerns
since the extent to which a person rose up in an organization is a reflection of her
competency.
Another concern that may arise with the current setting is that the client firm only
observes the set of candidates who are pre-selected by the search firms. If the search firm
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over-selects on certain characteristics, then it may seem like the client prefers such
characteristics to a lesser degree. Although as discussed in the Data and Methods section
about the lack of clarity regarding whose decision it is to stop proceeding to the next
round, I report the results in Table 2.4, replicating the main models that I used in Table
2.3. Here, the dependent variable is whether the candidate made it to the shortlist
submitted to the client firm after an interview with the executive search firm. Although
there seems to be a slight penalty for people who frequently changed jobs, the effect is no
longer significant with other controls, as are other independent variables that I use in the
main analyses.
This study hopes to add to the study of strategic human capital by suggesting that
firms screen out potential job-hoppers at the hiring phase in order to manage the
challenge that is rooted at the issue of mobility. An interesting future study would be to
understand whether the firms are able to capture some rent from the value that the loyal
workers are creating, and under which circumstances.
Understanding how different mobility signals are valued in the market is
important for firms because of the following two reasons: first, understanding the pattern
of competition in the labor market will allow firms to recruit new hires more effectively
by offering an appropriate level of compensation at the market rate; second, recognizing
workers’ perspective and their goals in terms of building a portfolio of careers will help
firms build value propositions that are more attractive to their workers and potential hires.
For example, because moving across employers is going to be penalizing unless it
provides opportunities for diversifying their functional experiences, candidates may
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prefer to move to jobs that provide this new opportunity. Hence, firms with the capability
of selecting candidates with potentials rather than the actual track record of relevant work
experience and the resources to train the new hires to work in new functions are going to
be able to hire these workers at lower cost.
Such reasoning reflects an emerging theme that adds to the traditional approach of
dealing with retention issues that focused on minimizing turnover. For certain firms, the
way to achieve an advantage in the labor market may be to build a streamline of workers
who come work for experience at lower wage rate, and leave with the acquired
experience. Eventually, the reputation will allow the firms to continue to attract workers
who wish to advance their career in such a way.
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CHAPTER 3: CLIENT PREFERENCES AND GENDER-BASED SELECTION

Introduction
Decades of research in various fields of social science have been devoted to
discussing the problem of gender inequality in our society and investigating its cause
with the hopes that such research may eventually be help mitigate this widespread issue.
Particularly in the labor market, we know that women earn less (Blau & Kahn, 2007), are
less likely to access “good” jobs (Kalleberg, Reskin, & Hudson, 2000), and are less likely
to be promoted than their male counterparts (McCue, 1996). Concerns about lack of
women in executive roles—a phenomenon commonly known as the “glass ceiling”—
have also gained a great deal of attention (Helfat, Harris, & Wolfson, 2006; Morrison,
White, & Van Velsor, 1992), This is a particularly important area of study because it not
only affects overall pay discrepancy between men and women but also has repercussions
on the hiring of women in other executive and non-executive jobs.

While there are explanations from both supply-side (are women either not as
qualified or not as interested in executive jobs?) and demand-side forces (do companies
prefer to hire men over equally qualified women?) that contribute to inequality in terms
of women’s access to executive jobs, I focus on a demand-side force that contributes to
the glass ceiling for women; specifically, how employers’ preferences impact hiring
decisions. I draw on role congruity theory which suggests that women are disadvantaged
during hiring for executive positions because leadership roles are stereotyped to be
masculine, and are assumed to require agentic qualities in order to be successful in the
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job (Eagly & Karau, 2002). Existing research on this topic has primarily been conducted
under the Goldberg paradigm of experiments, where participants evaluate fictitious
resumes and profiles that only differ in terms of gender (Goldberg, 1968). My study is
going to provide a new piece of evidence to this literature by being the first to directly
test the mechanisms in this theory in an actual setting of hiring executives.

Theoretically, I distinguish between the general level of masculinity that is casted
at the role-level and the specific masculine vs. feminine qualities that the hiring party
looks for in each role as they seek out candidates for the vacancy. While the former is
more stable and held by the collective of people in the context (i.e., various stakeholders
inside and outside the organization as well as the hiring committee), the latter may be
affected by various internal and external circumstances and the characteristics of the
hiring committee that is in charge of the selection. The goal of this study is not to
comprehensively address all of the factors that go into the selection process; rather I
directly take the hiring committees’ preferences for each search event and see how if
affects who gets selected.
I measure client’s preferences for candidates for each search by applying topic
modeling method to extract and quantify topics from the candidate requirements section
in job descriptions. Candidate requirements can be regarded as reflections of clients’
mental models of an ideal candidate for the position. They are by no means a perfect,
comprehensive representation – as some preferences may not be appropriate or even legal
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to share with the candidates, such as a preference for certain gender13 – but it will capture
an important part of the preferences of the client firm.14

This paper contributes to the studies of gender inequality by proposing a novel
way to measure clients’ preferences and directly testing the relationship between the
clients’ preference for agentic or communal attributes and the gender of the selected
candidate.

The structure of this paper is as follows: In the theory section, I discuss how
gender prejudice may play out in executive jobs, and state my proposition which serves
as a basis for my hypotheses. Then, I introduce job descriptions as a document to
measure clients’ preferences. Just before introducing my data, I outline the method that I
use in this paper. After discussing the data and the process of parsing and coding the
documents, I present the topics that are extracted from the candidate requirements,
followed by the hypotheses I test. Then I discuss the results from the main and
supplementary analyses, and implications for future research.

13

Gender targeted-ads are common in certain countries outside the U.S., such as China (Kuhn & Shen,
2013).
14
How closely would the job description document map on to the actual preference of the client firms?
What kind of information would the client firm not want to share with the candidate? Aside from legal
concerns that firms have, such as preferences with regard to gender or ethnicity, we could also imagine a
case where the client firm preferred a candidate who is referred by a current employee, but would not make
such information explicit in order to prevent discouraging a high quality, but unconnected candidate from
applying. This is an interesting question for future research, but beyond the scope of this paper.
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Theory
Gender prejudice in executive jobs
Lack of women in executive roles – the well-known “glass ceiling phenomenon”
–, combined with the evermore-increasing executive pay, continues to contribute to the
wage disparity between men and women. The fact that executive jobs are maledominated makes such job (as well as lower-level jobs) more accessible to male
candidates because the decision makers will predominantly be men (Kanter, 1977;
Rivera, 2015) and will strengthen the masculine image of the jobs which may affect the
behaviors of potential applicants as well as the evaluators.
Such limited access to top jobs for women is what scholars refer to as “allocative
discrimination” (Petersen & Saporta, 2004).15 Allocative discrimination is more severe in
the context of external hiring compared to internal promotions because the evaluator is
more likely to resort to heuristics and cognitive biases when they have less information
about the evaluatee and the outcome is more uncertain (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974).
Hence in this paper, I focus on the mechanisms of gender prejudice during external
hiring.

Eagly and Karau (2002) use role congruity theory to explain why firms regard
women as less qualified for leadership roles. Role congruity theory applied to the
leadership context highlights the incongruity between gender roles and leadership roles
15

Scholars have identified different avenues through which gender inequality is generated in the labor
market. First is allocative discrimination which limits women’s access to high paying jobs; second is
discriminative wage within a same job; third is valuative discrimination where female-dominated jobs have
lower wage than male-dominated jobs. In the U.S. context, the second type of discrimination has been
mostly ruled out (Petersen & Morgan, 1995).
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when a female takes on or attempts to take on a leadership position. There are two
attributes that researchers focus on in this context, agentic vs. communal, in order to
illuminate the prejudice that women face. The former is congruent with masculinity, and
the latter with femininity. Hence, the following proposition naturally follows:

Proposition. Women are less likely to be selected when the hiring committee
emphasizes the agentic qualities and more likely to be selected when the hiring
committee emphasizes communal qualities.
Role congruity theory suggests that because the qualities that are believed to be
necessary in order to be successful in leadership roles are mostly agentic, people believe
that women—who are associated with communal qualities—will be less successful in
those roles.

Researchers have acknowledged that while the generic leader role is ascribed to
being predominantly masculine, there are variations with regard to the masculinity in the
definition of these terms depending on the sector, functional area and the hierarchical
rank of the position. It is also reasonable to think that even within the same sector,
function, and level of position, a particular set of circumstances may encourage the hiring
firm to look for a different mix of agentic and communal traits.

Hence, the cleanest way to test the role congruity theory is to directly measure the
clients’ preferences – what they think are the needed attributes in order to be successful
in a job – and to estimate the relationship between the measured preferences and the
gender of the selected candidate. I suggest that job descriptions are an appropriate place
to effectively measure clients’ preferences.
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Job descriptions
When firms are filling executive positions, they first need to determine the position
requirements and the candidate requirements prior to recruiting potential candidates
(London, 2001). These together make up the basis of the job description. While the
position requirements layout the activities or tasks performed in this role, the candidate
requirements describe the desired KSA’s (Knowledge, Skills, and Abilities) and various
characteristics. Interviews with 500 executives in 1993 (Sessa, Kaiser, Taylor, &
Campbell, 1998) revealed that the requirements include the following categories: specific
functional backgrounds, managerial skills, interpersonal skills, communication skills,
technical knowledge, leadership skills, team skills, specific task skills, experience in a
particular field, specific degrees, experience in a particular industry, specific business
experience, ethics, company knowledge, energy or drive, strategic planning skills, fit with
culture, intelligence, creativity or innovation, and flexibility or adaptability.

The process of crafting job descriptions allows client firms to concretize and
coordinate what they are looking for in candidates. For individual recruiters, the process
of crafting job descriptions helps them formulate and organize ideas more thoroughly,
and for a group of recruiters, it allows them to effectively communicate their similarities
and differences in each of their mental models and eventually coordinate their
preferences.

The main purpose of writing a job description is first for the client to articulate
and agree on what it is they really want and second to for the firm to clearly communicate
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the job requirements to individuals who may be interested. In the process, it can facilitate
better and faster matching between the job and individuals. At times, however, it brings
about possibly unintended consequences, as research found that gendered language in job
descriptions disproportionately attracts male and female applicants (Rho & Castilla,
2014). If the hiring company did not have a strong gender preference, language that they
use in their job description will limit the pool of candidates to a certain gender, lowering
the potential for an optimal match.

As such, studies on job descriptions suggest that they play a significant role inside
and outside the firm. Theoretically, our current understanding of job descriptions can
inform hiring literature as it acknowledges the fact that the qualities of candidates are
multi-dimensional. For the sake of parsimony especially in papers with formal models,
workers are oftentimes divided into the “high types” and “low types” depending on their
one-dimensional quality. In the real world, of course, worker quality is multidimensional, with varying correlations between each dimension. My approach in this
paper takes into account such multi-dimensionality in clients’ preferences for candidates
as well as in candidates’ characteristics. I assume that the client preferences will vary
depending on multiple factors, such as client and position characteristics, the
characteristics of the hiring committee, the cause of vacancy and internal and external
change that the firm is facing.
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In this study, I use topic modeling – a type of content analysis tool – to extract the
multiple dimensions of qualities from the candidate requirements. Before describing topic
modeling, however, I briefly outline what content analysis is.

Content analysis
Content analysis, a method that makes inferences by interpreting and coding textual
materials, is at the intersection of the qualitative and quantitative research (Duriau, Reger,
& Pfarrer, 2007). It has a long history in the field of social science (Morris, 1994) and has
gained interest by the scholars in management in the past two decades (Duriau et al.,
2007). At the heart of the content analysis is the assumption that texts represent cognitive
schemas of the authors including values, intentions, and attitudes (Carley, 1997).

What contributed to the popularity of content analysis in recent years is the
increased access to various types of texts (e.g., web scraping) and the means to analyze
them. In the field of management, scholars have analyzed various types of texts such as
shareholder letters (D'Aveni & MacMillan, 1990; Shin & You, 2013), news articles
(Bednar, Love, & Kraatz, 2015) and corporate websites (Meyskens & Paul, 2010). The
parsed texts that are quantified are commonly merged with other quantitative datasets to
generate further insights.

Despite the usefulness of content analyses, which open up arrays of opportunities
for researchers, there are challenges associated with the method. First, when contents are

79
coded manually16, reliability and validity concerns arise; hence, multiple coders are
involved to assess inter-coder reliability. Manual coding also becomes burdensome with
the amount of the texts. Both of these problems were solved as researchers began to use
computer-aided text analysis (CATA) (or computer-facilitated qualitative data analysis
(CQDA)). It not only allowed researchers to code a vast amount of texts, but also the
explicit coding rules resolved many of the concerns with regard to reliability (Wolfe,
Gephart, & Johnson, 1993).

CATA at this stage, however, still had its drawbacks: it still required the users to
have pre-conceived categories that they wanted to quantify from the texts, either from
existing theories, libraries that other researchers had created or by scanning a subset or
entirety of the given texts. The next generation of CATA, topic modeling, allowed
researchers to bypass this issue.

Topic modeling
Topic modeling is a type of machine learning technique that allows users to discover
topics in a collection of unstructured documents by looking at how often a group of
words appears together (Blei, 2012). As with any CATA, researchers are able to analyze
a large amount of data. What distinguishes topic modeling from other CATA, as
mentioned above, is that it is essentially an inductive approach: the user does not impose
any pre-conceived categories and is able to discover the topics that emerge from the data.
16

The most popular method to quantify the texts has been to count the occurrences of specific topic words
that researchers have identified from the texts. Duriau and his colleagues (2007) found that 84% of the
articles in management studies that used content analysis have used some form of frequency counts.
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Moreover, the technique allows the same word to have different meanings depending on
the context. This is an important feature because many words have more than one
definition (e.g., the word “stock” in “stock price” vs. “stock of goods”) and even the
same word with the same dictionary definition can have different nuance depending on
the context in which it appears (Saussure, 1983).

The simplest and most commonly used statistical model in the field of social
science is the Latent Dirichlet Allocation (LDA)17. The intuition in this model is that a
document contains a mix of topics, which is defined to be a distribution over a fixed set
of vocabulary. The assumption here is that these topics are specified before any document
is generated and that the words in the same topic are more likely to appear together in a
document (Blei, 2012). An important choice that researchers need to make when
implementing this method is to set the number of the topics. I explore and discuss this
issue in more detail in the below section.

Kaplan and Vakili (2015) were one of the first to implement this method in the
field of strategic management. They used topic modeling to identify topics in patent
documents to code topics in order to find the originators of each topic. This was a
particularly useful approach, especially because it was hard to determine the categories of
ideas a priori, and it was necessary to be able to grasp the entire universe of patent
documents in order to track the originator.

17

Computer scientists continue to develop more complex models of topic modeling, for example, that
could also take account of the fact some topics are more related to each other than other topics (correlated
topic model (CTM)) (Blei & Lafferty, 2007), or that the set of vocabularies evolve over time as new words
are invented and cross language boundaries (Zhai & Boyd-Graber, 2013).
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Data and Methods
Using data from 330 position descriptions (about 85% of the searches in the dataset had
these documents) from the searches conducted by the search firm between 2005 and
2012, I took the following steps to implement the topic modeling technique. First, I
manually isolated the “candidate requirement” section from the position description
documents. Position descriptions were written by the search firm after consulting with the
client firm and were distributed to the candidates who were interested in the position
when contacted by the search firm. Each of these documents contains the description
about the client firm, the job responsibilities, and the candidate requirements. It is this
last section of each of these documents that I use in my analyses as a proxy for the client
firms’ preferences, their mental model of the ideal candidate.

The first step is to determine the definition of the documents. Because the
candidate requirements documents had multiple paragraphs with different themes, I
defined the document at this paragraph level. After separating each paragraph into
separate text documents, I trained the model by feeding these documents into the mallet
program (http://mallet.cs.umass.edu/topics.php) as suggested in Kaplan and Vakili
(2015). After setting the number of topics and running the model, the program outputs
two files: one containing the group of words that belongs to each topic, and another that
reports the proportion of each topic in each document. Because these documents are at
the paragraph-level, I aggregated these proportion to the search-level by weighting them
with the length of the paragraph.
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I assume that a factor that is mentioned at a greater length is more important to the
client firm. This is a commonly used approach by those who employ content analysis,
although Weber (1990) has cautioned researchers that omission of certain content may
not mean that the author is not concerned with the topic. In our context – as I mentioned
previously – companies may not explicitly state preferences that are illegal, for example.

An important choice that researchers should make when utilizing topic models is
setting the number of topics. Even though there is a tool to optimize the number of topics
that maximize efficacy and its statistical coherence within topics (Mimmo & Blei, 2011),
it does not necessarily mean that that each group will have a clear, interpretable theme
(Chang, Gerrish, Wang, Boyd-Graber, & Blei, 2009). In fact, Chang and his colleagues
find that there is even a negative relationship between the “fit” metric and humans’
evaluation of qualitative coherence. Note that it is the researchers’ job to label each topic
manually – if the topics do not have qualitative internal consistency, this exercise will not
be feasible and will limit the researchers ability to further derive insights from the texts.

Hence, DiMaggio and his colleagues (2013) suggest that multiple parameters
should be explored in order to choose the number of topics that best suits the focus of the
research question. The number would vary depending on the research question, and the
authors ended up choosing 12 topics to explore newspaper articles that mention
governments’ support for arts. Kaplan and Vakili (2015) chose 100 topics to from patent
documents, after which they were able to label them with the help of nanotechnology
experts. The authors followed the approach in Blei and Lafferty’s (2007) in choosing the
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100 topic-solution, but if the experts who labeled the topics noticed the need to have
either more or less granular topics, the authors could have re-set the number of topics.

In the example that I show below, I illustrate how the groupings of words vary
depending on the number of topics. For illustrative purposes, I isolated the topics that
contained the word “leadership.” Note that each keyword can appear in more than one
topic – such allowance makes it possible for the same word to represent different
meanings in different contexts. When the number of topics is set to 10, there are two
topics that contain the word “leadership.” However, we see that in group 10-A there are a
number of words (underlined) that have low relevance to leadership. But a majority of
those words are removed from the topic groups when the number of topics is set at 15 or
20, which tells us that 10 topics may not be granular enough for our purposes. Between
the 15 and 20 topics scheme, we are able to see that the group 15-B is parted into two
different groups (group 20-B and 20-C) in the 20 topics scheme, whereas the group 15-A
is more or less similar even in the 20 topics scheme (group 20-A).

-- Insert Table 3.1 Here --

In my context, another challenge is to isolate or exclude keywords that are
specific to certain industry or function. For example:
care health healthcare clinical system medical quality delivery
improvement hospital patient principles orientation practice excellence
nursing outcomes safety managed

This batch of words is specific to the healthcare industry, and hence will need to
be excluded from the analysis. One option is to manually take the words out before re-
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training the model, and the second option is to leave them in so that they may cluster
together by themselves. I tried using both methods, but the second option did not fully
extract industry-specific words out of each topic group. When such industry-specific
words remain in batches of words, it makes the measure noisier. For example, let’s say
category “leadership” also contained words that are specific to industry A. Then a job in
industry A (which will naturally contain more industry A-specific words) will carry a
higher weight in term of leadership. Hence, I chose to manually exclude the words when
they appeared in the list of keywords. This was a reiterative process because new words
may pop up in the list of keywords after I eliminate certain words.

After exploring the outputs with varying parameters and exclusion of industryspecific words, I finalized the group of topics as in Table 3.2, using the 20-topic scheme
that is granular enough to sensibly group a number of topics. Here, there are still groups
of words (Category “M” in Table 1) that are not internally consistent enough to give an
appropriate label. Only taking into account internally consistent topics, I labeled the 9
topics out of 20 as follows: Education, Leadership (informal, formal, managing teams &
mentorship), Management (Managing change, managing strategic relationships,
managing collaborative relationships), Communication skills, Commitment and values,
Strategy, Financial and technical skills and Operations. Note that a lot of these topics
map onto the topics that Sessa and her colleagues (1993) identified in their study of job
descriptions.

-- Insert Table 3.2 Here --
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Now that I have extracted the topics from the candidate requirements, I develop
hypotheses on how it will affect the client firms’ selections.

Hypotheses
I anchor my analyses around gender as well as the focal variables in the first
chapter of this dissertation such as mobility, tenure at the current employer and functional
diversity.

From the 12 topics that I extracted from the candidate requirements, I identified
agentic traits as follows: leadership, strategic skills, financial and technical skills, and
operations skills. These skills are in line with the described agentic qualities in leaders
such as “the ability to act as a change agent (e.g., inspirational, decisive), managerial
courage (e.g., courageous, resilient), results orientation (e.g., action oriented, proactive)
and leadership (e.g, leader, strategic thinker)” (Eagly & Karau, 2002, p.577). Moreover,
financial and technical skills and operations skills require quantitative skills that are
ascribed to be a masculine skill (Steffens, Jelenec, & Noack, 2010). In contrast, the
communal characteristics are communication skills and commitment and values.

I expect that when the hiring firm writes more extensively about a certain quality
compared to other companies, they are more likely to select male candidates when that
quality is agentic, and female candidates when it is communal.

H1. Women are less likely to be selected when the hiring company emphasizes the
agentic qualities ((a) leadership, (b) strategic skills, (c) financial and technical
skills, and (d) operations skills), and more likely to be selected when the hiring
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company emphasizes communal qualities ((e) communication skills and (f)
commitment and values).
Additionally, the following hypotheses are derived from Chapter 2 of my dissertation on
prior career mobility:

Mobility (Relative frequency of employer change). From the first chapter, my explanation
for the negative relationship between the frequency of moves across employers and the
probability of receiving an offer was that job hoppers are viewed as lacking loyalty. The
closest topic that maps onto this idea is the “commitment and values.”

H2. Candidates who have a high level of mobility are less likely to be selected
when the hiring company emphasizes the commitment and values.
Functional diversity. The two arguments from Chapter 2 for suggesting that the
functional diversity is going to be attractive in the market for executives was that they are
going to bring novel, fresher perspectives to the hiring organization and that they will be
effective coordinators and communicators. This is related to the “Management” aspect, in
particular managing strategic relationships.
H3. Candidates who have functionally diverse experience are more likely to be
selected when the hiring company emphasizes managing strategic relationships.
Tenure at the current firm. The argument from Chapter 2 for the negative effect of tenure
was cultural rigidity, that is, having been in the same organization longer might be
associated with being more deeply embedded in the culture of that organization. The
closest attribute that maps onto this idea is the change management.
H4. Candidates with longer tenure at the firm are less likely to be selected when
the hiring company emphasizes managing change.
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Empirical Approach
My main empirical approach to test these hypotheses follows my models in Chapter 1.
Using conditional logit model grouped at the vacancy-level, I estimate the probability of
receiving a job offer as a function of the independent variables and control variables. The
main focus of this chapter is to look at the interaction term between the independent
variables of interest and the “emphasis” variable, which is the proportion of the topic of
interest in the candidate requirement section of the job description document. Essentially,
it is testing whether a certain relationship becomes stronger or weaker depending on the
emphasis on each quality (topic). Note that for this analysis, I focus on those who
received an offer, not necessarily those who take the offer. This allows us to isolate the
demand-side mechanism of the selection process.

Results
Main Analysis
Table 3.3 reports the interaction terms from the conditional logit model. Most of the
effects are not statistically significant except for the following: In Model 7, we see that
when operations skills are emphasized, women are less likely to get selected. For one
standard deviation increase in the emphasis of operations skills, the odds of getting an
offer decreases by 54% for female candidates. In all other models, not only are the
interaction terms not statistically significant, but also, the female candidates are no less
likely than male candidates to receive the final offer. These results are in line with what
Fernandez-Mateo and Fennandez (2016) found in the context of British headhunters:
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once the candidates pass the initial stages of screening, female candidates have an equal
chance of being selected by the client firm.

As for the variables from the chapter, I do have directional support for all three
hypotheses (H2 through H4), but they are not statistically significant.

Supplementary analysis I
I confirmed in the above analyses that the evidence for gender-based selection is sparse
during the final round of selection. In order to see if there is any pattern among the
selected candidates, I restrict the sample to those who received an offer and compare the
characteristics of the selected candidates across client firms with differing preferences. In
effect, I estimate the likelihood that the successful candidate possesses the characteristic
of interest (gender, mobility, tenure, and functional diversity) as a function of different
proportions of preferred qualities in the job description documents. Because this set of
analyses is no longer contained within each search, it requires additionally controlling for
the vacancy-level variables. I include the year of search, the industry and the position of
vacancy, whether the client had a prior relationship with the search firm, the size of the
final list of candidates, the salary of the vacancy and the proportion of female candidates.
Note that in this set of analyses, we are unable to test where the differential outcomes
have originated. However, we have ruled out the possibility of the demand-side driven
mechanism from the client firm from the main analyses except for one hypothesis
concerning the preference for male candidates when operations skills are emphasized.
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The results from this set of analyses are reported in Table 3.4. First is the test of
the gender. From Model 1 in Table 3.4, we see that when leadership in terms of
managing teams and mentorship, managing relationships and operations skills are
emphasized, the selected candidate is less likely to be female. These are related to H1a,
H1b, and H1d. When communication skills are important, however, it is more likely to be
the female who receives a final offer. This is related to what was hypothesized in H1e.

With regard to the variables from Chapter 1, there were only directionally
supporting evidence. In addition, when skills related to operations were highlighted to a
greater extent, selected candidates were more likely to have had longer tenure at the
current firm. Finally, when strategic skills were emphasized, selected candidates were
less likely to be functionally diverse. This suggests that strategic skills may be
cognitively more correlated with depth than breadth.18

Putting together the gender-related results from the main analysis and the
supplementary analysis I (i.e., sparse evidence of gender-based selection in the final
stage, but existence of evidence of gender-based match overall), gender sorting may be

18

Because of high correlation between the topics however, the variation inflation factor (VIF) was found to
be very large, with an average of 60 across the 12 topics. I conducted exploratory factor analysis in order to
resolve this issue. Using principal component analysis (with the promax rotation), these 12 topics loaded
onto five different factors, as reported in Table 3.6. The scree plot of eigenvalues are plotted in Figure 3.1.
Although the topics did not seem to map cleanly onto these factors, we see that Factor 1 has the highest
loadings from informal leadership and managing relationships; Factor 2 with negative loading from
education; Factor 3 with negative loading from informal leadership; Factor 4 with operations; and Factor 5
with managing strategic relationships. Using these five factors instead of the 12 topics yielded much
smaller VIFs of less than 2 – however, I was not able to identify any significant relationship here. I
nonetheless report the results in Table 3.7.
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occurring in the previous rounds of the search be it from the supply-side (candidate
choosing to continue vs. withdraw from the search) or the demand-side (the search firm
choosing to pass vs. fail the candidate). As mentioned in the previous chapter, it is
difficult to distinguish these two due to lack of data on the reason why a candidate was
not included in the subsequent step of the search process. There still remains a stage,
however, where I can use for further investigation: the composition of the initial pool. I
check whether female candidates are disproportionately recruited in the initial contact
stage as a function of differing client preferences. In this context, because the candidates
are recruited by the search firm’s contact only, we can attribute the pattern we observe to
the search firm who seeks out the initial set of candidates (average size = 141) for the
position.

Supplementary Analysis II
I run two models to test whether the client preferences drive the composition of the pool:
first is the logit model that predicts the gender of the candidate as a function of the
different weight of client’s preferences. Second is the OLS model that predicts the
proportion of the female candidates in the initial pool. I control for the search
characteristics such as the rank and industry groups and the log of the proposed salary of
the vacant positions, and whether the client firm has worked with the search firm in the
previous years.

The results are reported in Table 3.5. In both of the analyses, I find that fewer
females were contacted when the client firm emphasized the leadership ability related to
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managing teams, but more female candidates were contacted when there was an emphasis
on strategic skills. One standard deviation increase in the emphasis on leadership skills
(teams) decreased the proportion of women by 3.4%, and one standard deviation
increased in the emphasis of strategic skills increased the proportion of women by 3.7%.
Hence, we are able to attribute some of the gender-based selection occurring at the very
early stage of the search, although the economic magnitude is not large. The first result is
in line with the expectation based on role congruity theory, although the second evidence
is in the opposite direction. Also, note that in both of the analyses, the salary of the
position is negatively related to the number of female candidates.

As for other client preferences that were significant predictors of the gender of the
successful candidate (from supplementary analysis I, Table 3.4) but not the predictors of
the composition of the initial pool– managing strategic relationships and communication
skills –, we can infer that the search firm may have been more favorable towards men
when managing strategic relationships was important for the client firm, and women
when communication skills were important. Similarly, from the candidate side, women
may have withdrawn more if strategic relationships were emphasized, and men may have
withdrawn more when communications skills were. While such supply-side mechanism
can certainly be at play, it is likely to be more negligible compared to other factors such
as pay or other aspects of job requirement such as the requirement to travel.
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Discussion
In this paper, I propose a novel method to measure client preferences for candidates’
skills for a given vacancy and test how it affects candidate selection, specifically
selection based on gender. This is a direct test of the role congruity theory applied to the
context of women’s access to leadership roles. Although I did not find strong evidence of
client preferences driving gender-based selections in the final round of selection, such
preferences seemed to exist in the previous rounds when pools are created by the search
firms. These results suggest that we need to further investigate the role of search firms as
the “gatekeepers” to executive jobs and the root of differential selection between the
search firm and the client firm.

There are limitations to studying this question based on actual selections of the
candidates. In particular, it is hard to make a clear case of causality because of the
unobserved heterogeneity. For example, I found that when operational skills were
emphasized, female candidates were less likely to be selected. While this may be a result
of the hiring company preferring a male over an equally qualified female, it could also be
possible that female candidates are not as qualified as male candidates in this domain.
This is a possibility if the hiring company is able to assess some of these skills more or
less accurately during the process of hiring, such as during the interview, which I do not
take into account in my data. One possible reason that we may see less-skilled women in
the same position is that the pressure to hire women – such as having quotas – may have
been greater than the actual possible supply of women with the appropriate skills. Hence,
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we need to take caution when interpreting these results.
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CHAPTER 4: BURNING BRIDGES OR BUILDING THEM? THE EFFECT OF
THIRD PARTY-INDUCED EMPLOYEE MOBILITY ON CLIENT RELATIONSHIP
FORMATION

Introduction
Interorganizational relationships have long received attention from strategy
scholars because of their implications for firm performance. While most work in this
arena has focused on collaborative ties such as strategic alliances or syndicates
(Beckman, Haunschild, & Phillips, 2004; Li & Rowley, 2002; Podolny & Page, 1998;
Shipilov, Rowley, & Aharonson, 2006), recent work has begun to acknowledge the
existence of conflictual ties such as disputes over intellectual property or breach of
contracts (Agarwal, Ganco, & Ziedonis, 2009; Lumineau & Oxley, 2012; Sytch, 2010).
In particular, recent research shows that relationships between two organizations tend to
shift towards a collection of either coherently collaborative or conflictual ties (Sytch &
Tatarynowicz, 2014).
While all organizations need to navigate these networks of positive and negative
ties, certain types of organizations in the modern economy are structurally forced to
straddle both kinds of ties by dint of the work they do: the professional services firms that
play a role of a representative in conflictual relationships (Fernandez & Gould, 1994;
Gould & Fernandez, 1989), firms I refer to as hired hands in this paper. Because of the
nature of their business, these firms are constantly involved in conflictual activities as
they work on behalf of their clients. Law firms fight for their clients, which may result in
financial and reputational losses for the counterparties; search firms help their clients find
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talent, which inevitably entails loss of talent from the targeted firm. Yet these firms must
also build their business by developing client relationships; what is challenging for these
hired hands, therefore, is that the competitors of their client may well have been, or could
be, potential clients themselves.
Do these hired hands burn bridges to their future clients as a consequence of
working on behalf of their current clients? Existing literature seems to suggest that they
do; conflictual activities should keep the two organizations – the professional services
firm and the negatively affected firm – from forming an agency-client relationship, for
two reasons. First, there is a tendency to maintain a coherent set of ties (either conflictual
or collaborative) between two organizations, because it is a more sustainable form (Sytch
& Tatarynowicz, 2014). Specifically, this balance theory posits that existing collaborative
ties protect the two parties from entering disputes, and conflictual ties undermine the
possibility of forming a collaborative relationship. If we think that the hired hands are
entering conflictual relationships with the competitors of their client, then the balance
theory suggests that it will negatively impact the relationship between them and the hired
hands. Second, the reciprocity norm suggests that negative acts will be reciprocated by
negative acts, and more often compared to positive acts (Gouldner, 1960).
Yet there may also be mechanisms that allow such conflictual activities to
actually increase the probability that a positive tie could form. I argue that first, the
departure of a senior manager increases the saliency of the hired hands in the eyes of the
affected firms. Increased contact and knowledge of the availability of those services may
increase the demand for those services (“supply-side induced demand”) (Sytch, n.d.), and
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increase the likelihood of positive tie formation. Also, the Behavioral Theory of the Firm
suggests that firms are boundedly rational and engage in satisficing behavior (Cyert &
March, 1963) , which implies that the firms cannot and do not have knowledge of the full
universe of the means that they could use or actors that they can work with to accomplish
their tasks and achieve their strategic goals, and will cease to actively engage in the
search for new information once they have reached the point where they have met their
aspired level. In the case of executive search firms, when a senior manager is poached
away with the help of a search firm, it gives the poached firm new information about the
possible agent in the market who could assist them in their hiring, which could prompt
them to hire the agent. Second, prior literature suggests that organizations actively seek to
form ties that could foster trustworthy behaviors (Ahuja, Soda, & Zaheer, 2012). Since
industry norms prevent the firms from inflicting harm on their own clients, firms may
seek to enter into a client relationship to prevent unfavorable behaviors from these firms
in the future. I explore these possibilities in the context of the executive search industry.
To test my hypotheses, I use a unique dataset from a mid-sized executive search
firm. I exploit a particular feature of this dataset to create an effective control group for
my empirical test. While the search firm is in charge of the initial selection process, from
creating a batch of potential candidates, contacting them and interviewing a subset of
candidates, it is ultimately the client who selects the candidate from the final slate of
candidates who pass the interview at the search firm, hence making the treatment (the
poaching event) more or less exogenous. The employers of the candidates who were on
the final slate but were not ultimately selected and poached serve as a good control group
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since they were also highly at risk of being poached, and of comparable qualities to those
who were poached. Using this data, I estimate a Cox hazard model to find that firms are
more likely to become clients of the search firm when one of their employees has been
poached as a result of the search process. This finding lends support to the possibility that
the dynamics of tie formation may indeed be different for these representatives in
conflictual relationships – what would normally “burn” relationships may actually help
them to “build” them. Additional analyses using location and industry areas of the firms
as moderators suggest that the effect is partially driven by the increased saliency of the
search firm as a result of the poaching event.

Theory and Hypotheses
Conflicts in Interorganizational Relationships
Conflicts commonly arise between organizations. Some conflicts between
reputable firms are observable to an external audience, such as lawsuits that are widely
covered by the media. Other conflicts are less visible, although the involved parties may
still inflict direct or indirect harm on the other party. Study of such conflictual, negative
ties has recently gained traction (Agarwal et al., 2009; Sytch, 2010; Sytch &
Tatarynowicz, 2014), and it allows us to better understand the whole picture of the set of
relationships between actors.
An interesting aspect of conflictual relationships between organizations is that
they commonly involve third parties – professional services firms who work on behalf of
client firms. Both patent infringement and antitrust lawsuits (Sytch, 2010), the most
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frequently studied conflictual activities between organizations thus far, require the
infringed upon firms to hire law firms to proceed with the dispute. This notion of
involving third parties in conflictual relationships is also implicit in contexts outside the
legal arena. For example, Khurana (2002) explains how firms hire headhunters to
minimize direct conflicts with other firms by keeping the search process confidential.
Both of the hired hands – the law firms and the headhunters – are actively involved in
potentially inflicting harm on the other party as they work for their clients. Does being
involved in conflicts in the past limit these hired hands from future business development
or provide an opportunity for them? In this paper, I explore this question in the context of
executive search firms.

Executive Search Firms as Third Party Representatives
Headhunters play an important role in the modern labor market for top managers
(Hamori & Cappelli, 2013; Khurana, 2002, p. 200), as firms use them as the main means
to fill vacancies in upper management (Association of Executive Search Consultants
(AESC), 2012). Scholars often describe these headhunters as brokers who connect two
otherwise disconnected parties (Stovel & Shaw, 2012); they help their clients tap into a
pool of candidates that the clients otherwise would not have full knowledge of
themselves, and open up opportunities to the candidates who are potentially interested in
the job. In essence, they are the matchmakers between the employers and employees
(Bonet et al., 2013).
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One should note, though, that this brokered, the seemingly triadic relationship
between the candidate, search firm and the client firm also involves a fourth party – the
current employer of the sought out candidate. Senior managers that headhunters recruit
are rarely unemployed or self-employed at the time of the search (Khurana, 2002), and
the successful completion of a search will require them to leave their previous job.
Hence, the nature of the search firm’s business creates a conflictual relationship between
the search firm and the current employer of the candidate, since the induced turnover of a
senior manager will cause the employer to incur a substantial cost.

Expected consequences for the hired hands
Existing studies suggest that these hired hands will suffer from negative
consequences. Recent work by Sytch and Tatarynowicz (2013) uses balance theory to
show how the relationships between two actors tend to shift to a coherent set of ties,
suggesting that conflictual relationships hinder the formation of collaborative ties and
vice versa. In the search context, this argument would suggest that each time the search
firm completes a search with one client, it will ruin a future client relationship with a
potential client: the firm that loses its employee as a result of the search. This prediction
is also consistent with reciprocity-based arguments in the sociological exchange literature
(Emerson, 1976; Gouldner, 1960) , in the sentiment of retaliation when the injury is
inflicted by one of the parties in a dyadic relationship. Even if the inflicted party does not
actively retaliate, that party may not be willing to enter a relationship that could benefit
the other party. Hence, we could expect that the “bereaved” companies are less likely to
become clients of the search firm.
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While such an expectation, based on balance theory and sociological exchange
theory, is plausible, there are also reasons to believe that the search firm will not face
such a constraint. The affected firm may well recognize that the hired hands are merely
“hired,” and that they do not have any other negative intentions outside the scope of their
work. This may weaken the cognitive element of conflicts (Pondy, 1967), enabling the
bereaved firm to react more rationally towards the aggression. If this is true, the act of
poaching itself will not negatively affect the relationship formation between the two
parties.
Rather, we might expect poaching to actually catalyze the relationship formation
between the search firm and the poached firm, for the following reasons. First, the act of
poaching would make the search firm more salient in the eyes of the poached firm.
Unlike the lower levels of the organization, the upper level positions are more visible to
the firm, and the firm will have a greater awareness of the turnover and its cause when it
occurs. When the bereaved firm realizes that a search firm induced the turnover,
knowledge of the other firm’s use of headhunters may induce the targeted firm to also
consider using it. Because the firm was directly affected, it may also perceive that the use
is more prevalent than it actually is. Second, the poached firm may be assured of the
quality of the search firm, as it successfully poached their own employee. The targeted
firm does not see the full set of candidates who were considered and is likely to assume
that its employees are highly competent. Hence, they may expect to find a competent
candidate by working with this search firm. Also, the more confident that an employer is
about its own quality, the more impressive it will seem that the search firm was able to
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persuade its employee to leave. Third, because relationships harness trustworthy
behaviors between the involved actors and industry norms prevent search firms from
poaching from their own clients, the affected firm may be motivated to build a client
relationship with the search firm in order to prevent future raiding from the same search
firm. Hence, I hypothesize that:
Hypothesis 1. Companies whose turnover in senior management was induced by a
search firm are more likely to become clients of the search firm.

The Information-providing Trigger
These arguments not only suggest that firms may form relationships with
headhunters who have poached their employee, but also provide evidence on when such
behavior is more likely. In particular, if poaching a firm’s worker does indeed increase
the salience of the search firm in the eyes of the affected firm, then the effects (the higher
likelihood of becoming a client when poached) are likely to be stronger when that
salience adds any value to the existing information stock of the affected firm.
The Behavioral Theory of the Firm suggests that firms are boundedly rational,
implying that they are not aware of the entire universe of information. Moreover, firms
engage in problem-based searches (Cyert & March, 1963; Gavetti, Greve, Levinthal, &
Ocasio, 2012). The tendency to satisfice makes firms reach a “stable state” where they
believe they have acquired enough information and no longer need to take additional
actions. Under such circumstances, we could think that the firms may only act when they
are “triggered” by new information. The notion of “supply-side induced demand” (Sytch,
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2015) also speaks to the similar phenomenon where buyers do not need the services
before they know that the services are available in their proximity and that their peers are
using them. These triggers provide them with new information, and may also encourage
them to seek out new services.
Given that firms can be triggered by new information, when can poaching provide
new information for the firms? Studies have highlighted the role that geography plays in
shaping the information that a firm has, that inbound (Rosenkopf & Almeida, 2003) or
outbound (Corredoira & Rosenkopf, 2010) mobility from and to a nearby region is likely
to create knowledge channels that are redundant, and firms are less likely to benefit from
the inflow of information from those channels.
Following this logic, companies that are located in the same city where the search
firm operates are already highly likely to know or have heard about this search firm, and
the information that they obtain from the mobility event will not be new and will not
affect the status quo strategy, compared to the companies located outside the city that are
less likely to be aware of the existence of the firm ex ante.
Hypothesis 2. Companies that are located in the same city as the search firm’s
headquarters, or where the search firm’s branches operate, are less likely to
become clients of the search firm, compared to companies located elsewhere
when sourced.
Network Defense
Another contingency that we can explore is the value of the client relationship,
given that firms use client relationship as a means to avoid future aggression by the hired
hand. Studies show that once two parties enter into a relationship, albeit a transactional
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one, they are more likely to behave collaboratively; the existence of a collaborative tie
reduces the probability that a conflictual tie will form (Sytch & Tatarynowicz, 2013).
Even after taking into account the endogeneity that arises from the non-random selection
of the partners (i.e., actors are more likely to form ties with more trustworthy partners), a
sense of trust brews between the partners ex post, and the formation of a tie itself restricts
certain behaviors from the partner whether it is bounded legally or culturally. In the
executive search industry, this notion is set in stone by a regulation called the “off limits
agreement,” in which the search firm and the client firm enter into a contract that
prohibits the search firm from considering candidates from that client firm in their future
searches for other clients. The agreement usually lasts for approximately two years, and
the boundary of the “limits” (e.g., the entire firm, a specific department or specific group
of people with certain job titles) are also agreed upon at the time of drafting the contract.
Such a method of protecting via forming a tie is similar to the notion of “network
defense” described in a recent work by Hernandez, Sanders, and Tuschke (2015). They
explain how organizations use various means to alter the network structure around them
to prevent information leakage to its competitors that are connected through indirect ties.
In this context, I suggest that a different type of network defense could be at play, where
the tie formation could be used as a means to prevent future aggression.
Given that relationship formation can prevent future aggression from the
aggressor, whether the affected firm chooses to use this strategy may be positively related
to (1) the likelihood of future aggression and (2) the magnitude of the potential harm.
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In the context of executive search, there are at least two reasons to believe that the
firms may expect repeated poaching from the same search firm. First, having poached an
employee from the firm implies that the search firm knows about the firm, and likely
other viable candidates within the firm as well. Second, because of the established
relationship between the mobilized employee (the “ex-employee” of the poached firm,
after he or she has moved) and the search firm, the ex-employee may refer colleagues
from his or her previous employer to the search firm for other searches.
The second factor, the magnitude of the potential harm, will positively correlate
with how harmful the first aggression was. Most voluntary turnover creates a cost for the
affected firms, but the cost will be especially high if the employee moves to a competitor
of the poached firm (Somaya et al., 2008). The leaked information about the previous
employer, if any, will be more valuable to a competitor than a non-competitor, and the
employee may carry away client accounts that he or she has accumulated while working
at that firm. Hence, the expected harm will be larger if the employee is poached away to
its competitor, and the affected firm will be more motivated to form client relationship
with the search firm to defend itself. Hence, I hypothesize that:
Hypothesis 3. Companies whose employees are poached to their competitors in
the same industry areas are more likely to become clients of the search firm
compared to companies whose employees are poached to firms in other industry
areas.

Data and Methods
One important assumption that I make in this paper is that the bereaved firms are
aware of the identity of the responsible search firm. Interviews with HR professionals
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suggest that firms usually find out which search firm was involved in the process. As for
the senior managers who move, claiming that the move was “passive” (i.e., the search
consultants sought them out, rather than them actively seeking out new outside
opportunities) made the transition smoother for them, which would naturally lead to
disclosing the name of the search firm involved as well. On top of this, many prominent
searches are advertised through media, revealing the name of the search firm that is in
charge of the process (see Figure 4.1). AESC also broadcasts some of the new and
completed searches on its website19. Lastly, if there exist cases where the bereaved firm is
not aware of the identity of the search firm, the noise will dilute the hypothesized effects
above, making the test more conservative.
I test my hypotheses using data from a mid-sized executive search firm
headquartered in the US, which I will call SearchCo in this paper. In order to test H2, the
moderation hypothesis looking at the value of saliency that varies by geographic location,
it is important that SearchCo is not the most well-known firm in this industry, in which
case there will be a limited variance of the baseline knowledge about this firm in the first
place. SearchCo is not among the top 10, but still large enough to have conducted a
number of searches during the observed period.
This dataset consists of all search records for the years between 2005 and 2012,
including information on the entire set of candidates for each step of the search process. It

19

The postings can be found at:
https://members.aesc.org/eweb/DynamicPage.aspx?webcode=NewSearches. An example of a posting is as
follows: “Heidrick & Struggles has recruited Mohamad Ali as the next president and chief executive officer
of Carbonite, Inc.. Mr. Ali joins Carbonite from Hewlett-Packard Co., where he served as chief strategy
officer. Carbonite is a provider of cloud and hybrid backup and recovery solutions for businesses.”
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provides the list of candidates who were considered, contacted, interviewed by the search
firm, interviewed by the client firm, offered the job, and ultimately, the name of the
candidate who has accepted the job.
The sample for analysis was constructed by using the names of the employers of
the candidates at the time of the search, and the analysis was done at the firm level. As
explained above, I restricted the sample to the companies of candidates who made it to
the final round of the filtering process, which is the interview with the client where the
list of candidates to be interviewed is determined from the initial interview at the search
firm. This restriction provides a good setting for my analysis for a number of reasons.
First, the firms of the candidates in the final slate are all at risk of being poached. Search
firms are concerned about their reputation when presenting the final slate to their clients
so that candidates with a very low chance of being liked by the client will hardly make it
to the final list. Also, it is possible that these firms are of comparable quality, reflecting
clients’ tastes and preferences. Finally, the choice of the candidate is more or less
exogenous at this point, since the choice the client is making for its own sake is highly
unlikely to be correlated with the motives of the search firm regarding its future business
development. There is still a possibility that the client’s selection will be influenced by
search firm’s preference through the conversations with the search consultants and
consultants’ evaluation of the interviewed candidates. Nevertheless, conversations with
the search consultants at SearchCo confirmed that SearchCo is not aware of the possible
rippling effect that this paper seeks to investigate. After all, the search consultants are
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responsible for their own searches, and seek to find the candidate that could best suit each
client’s needs.
In order to be used in the analysis, only the previous employers with identifiable
names could enter the sample. 0.8% of the sample was dropped because the name the
employer was missing. Also, the employer names needed to be matched to information
regarding industry and location. These data were collected separately using databases
such as Compustat, Orbis, Capital IQ and Lexis-Nexis, Linkedin and company websites,
and I was able to match 80.9% of the firms. In the end, 1577 unique firms from 499
searches were included in the analysis. Among those, 33 firms (2.09%) became clients of
the search firm during this time period. 11 (3.57%) were from those that were poached,
and 22 (1.74%) were from the control group.

Variables
Poached. The dummy variable equals one if the firm is the previous employer of the
candidate who was chosen by the client firm, and zero otherwise.
Located in the same city. I created a dummy variable that equals one if the firm (both the
poached firm and other firms that were also at risk of being poached) is located in the
same city as the search firm, and zero otherwise.
Mobility to a competitor firm. The dummy variable equals one if the client firm and the
target firm are in the same industry area, and zero otherwise. I used the 3-digit NAICS
code to code the industries.
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Other controls. I control for whether the firm is in the industry areas that the search firm
specializes in. Controlling for this variable is necessary to resolve omitted variable bias
since the firms in such industry areas have a higher likelihood of being poached (because
there are already many clients who are in these industry areas) and also are more likely to
become clients compared to companies in other industry areas. I also control for whether
the firm is a public company. Whether the firm has prior ties with the SearchCo would
also be an important control. None of the firms that enter the sample during this period of
time had a prior relationship with SearchCo, and the variable was not used in the model
because of the lack of any variation.

Model
I estimate the probability of becoming a client by using the Cox hazard model,
setting duration as the time between when the search closed and when the firm became a
client. The dummy variable for whether the firm became a client was used as the failure
event. If a firm appeared more than once in the data (i.e., candidates from the same firm
were considered multiple times for different searches), I took the close date of the first
search that appeared in the dataset. The main independent variable in the analysis is a
dummy variable indicating whether or not the candidate from that firm was selected and
placed at the client firm. This variable, Poached, when it is equal to one, signifies that the
said firm experienced employee poaching when the search process was completed at the
search firm. H2 and H3, moderation hypotheses were tested by interacting the moderation
variable with Poached.
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I theoretically assume that the poached firm is able to identify which search firm
was involved in this process, and anecdotal evidence corroborates this assumption as I
mentioned above. Although it is possible that some poached companies do not know the
identity of the search firm, the existence of such companies will only help to nudge the
coefficient towards zero, making the test more conservative.

Results
The summary statistics showing the means, standard deviations and correlations
are in Table 4.1.
The results support H1, that employee poaching increases the likelihood of a
subsequent client relationship between the search firm and the poached firm (Table 4.2,
Model 1 to 4). The coefficient (odd ratio) from the Cox hazard model in Table 4.2
suggests that the odds of becoming a client of the search firm are about two to three times
as high compared to the firms in the control group. As explained in the Methods section,
a possible alternative explanation for this result is that the pool of potentially poachable
candidate’s firms and the client pool overlap because of the search firm’s specialization
in a certain industry. To address this issue, I controlled for the two central areas that
together make up about 40% of the business of this search firm. The result holds with this
specification (Model 2), with a slightly smaller coefficient on the main independent
variable. As expected, firms that are in the specialty area of the search firm are twice as
likely to become clients.
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I also find supporting evidence for H2 in Model 3, where the positive effect of
poaching on client relationship formation is smaller for firms that are located in the same
city that the search firm’s branches are located in. Being in the same city reduces the rate
of forming a client relationship by 85.9% when comparing between the raided
companies. As for H3, the firms who lost their employees to the competitor firms are
more likely to become clients of the search firm, but the effect is not statistically
significant (Model 4).

Discussion
In this paper, I explore a tension that hired hands – third party representatives in
conflictual relationship – may face as they work on behalf of their clients. On the one
hand, they may be losing future clients as they hurt those potential clients in the course of
assisting current clients. On the other hand, that same act may prove their competency
and increase the saliency in the eyes of the affected firms, or may incentivize them to
protect themselves in the future, thereby motivating them to enter into a client
relationship with the hired hands. The data lend support to the latter scenario, where
poaching from a firm actually increases the likelihood of forming a client relationship
with the affected firm.
This paper attempts to further understand the contingencies under which such
effect is stronger. By showing that firms not located in the same city as the search firm,
when poached, are more likely to form a client relationship compared to firms located in
the same city, I suggest the possibility that the act of poaching is an “information-
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providing trigger” that allows the targeted firm to consider hiring them in the future. This
is another evidence of a supply-side induced demand that is created not by proximity, as
explored previously in the literature (Sytch, 2013), but by the inadvertent “contact” by
the service provider that is, in effect, harmful for the targeted firm.
I did not find empirical support for the other proposed moderation hypothesis,
where I expected to find a greater probability of client relationship formation for firms
whose employees moved to competitor firms, as the targeted firms may use the client
relationship as a means to prevent future poaching. This result is also reasonable, as the
cost of hiring search firms is substantial. Also, the fact that the search firm poached from
them once may mean that the search firm may be reluctant to poach from them again,
which may truly hurt their relationship. Indeed, literature on talent raiding defines
“raiding” when it occurs at least twice (Gardner, 2002).
Professional services firms play a big role in the modern economy, and they
provide an interesting context to advance our understanding of interorganizational
relationships. The related examples to the phenomenon of hired hands that I explain in
this paper extend beyond the context of search firms and law firms. For example, once
management consulting firms or advertising agencies bring a client on board, it may have
implications for their future relationship with the client’s competitor. In a similar vein,
Rogan (2013) shows how merger and acquisition between advertisement agencies affect
the relationship with existing clients. Any such effect will heavily depend on the nature
of the relationship between the agency and the client: enduring or transactional. We could
expect that the effect would matter more for enduring relationships when the contract
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term itself is considerably long, or the reputation or the history of having worked with
certain clients lasts beyond the contracted period. Phillips, Turco, and Zuckerman (2013)
suggest that client types may matter in certain contexts. They find that having practiced
plaintiff’s personal injury law (PIL) is tantamount to betraying corporate clients, and this
discourages corporate law firms from practicing PIL. In the absence of such asymmetries
in client types in the search industry, even though the brokering role by executive search
firms clearly differentiates the winner and loser of the search, the fact that the two parties
are in fact symmetric helps search firms not be restricted by such disloyalty penalty.
An alternative explanation for this empirical pattern of increased tie formation
with the mobility event is that the poaching event creates a vacancy in the targeted firm
that will mechanically increase the need to hire any search firms, including the one that
facilitated the search. The limitation of the data is that we do not observe the entire set of
search firms that the affected firms could engage with, in which case we could compare
whether the poaching event increases the likelihood of the responsible search firm being
hired compared to other search firms. Nevertheless, the data show that the average gap
between the time poached and the time that the poached company signed on as a client
was two years, and the position was rarely for the same position, which mitigates some of
the concern.
Another interesting area to explore is to understand when the actors wish to
publicly disclose the ties with other actors. For example, the status literature describes
how low-status actors are able to gain from the status spillover when affiliated with high-
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status actors. Does the advertisement of affiliation come at a cost when it could curb
other parties’ motivation to build the relationship?
In this paper, I hope to contribute to the following streams of literature; first, to
the study of interorganizational relationships, by showing a case where the mechanisms
that commonly decrease the likelihood of tie formation may actually increase the
probability of it. This suggests that taking into account the characteristics of the actors is
indeed critical in predicting the evolution of relationships between organizations. Second,
I hope to expand our understanding of brokers. This paper suggests that they benefit not
only from their structural advantage as laid out in the previous literature (Burt, 2009), but
also from the nature of their role as representatives for their clients, and are shielded from
future repercussions even when they inflict harm on other actors in conflictual situations.
Because the trigger from them is neutralized by the nature of their role, an act that could
have been received negatively seems to work in their favor.
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CONCLUSION

The context of executive search firms is a promising and exciting area to
understand more about how the labor market for senior managers functions. This market
is a particularly interesting area of study for a broad set of audiences: for one, top
managers are critical to performance in most companies. Hence, it is important from the
firm’s strategic point of view to better understand the competition for senior managers in
the external labor market. Second, ever-rising compensation for executives makes each
job search consequential for individuals. In the era of boundaryless careers, it has become
important for individuals to take ownership of their own careers and understand how to
build them effectively across organizations. Finally, at the societal-level, each
individual’s ability to access top jobs translates into the issues of income equality. The
lack of women in top jobs not only widens the pay gap between men and women but also
continues to limit access to those jobs.
In each of my three empirical chapters, I attempt to demonstrate how the search
firm context can help illuminate important questions in the human capital literature and
the strategic management literature. I draw on and contribute to a variety of literatures,
including strategic human resource management, human capital theories, role congruity
theory, and social exchange theory to help gain a better understanding of the
contemporary labor market and yield practical as well as theoretical implications for
firms, individuals, and brokers in this context. Each empirical chapter fills a gap in the
three types of executive search research that I propose in the first chapter of the
dissertation: search firms as windows, gatekeepers, and brokers.
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First and foremost, executive search firms can serve as a window through which
we can better understand the mechanisms that determine the winners in this labor market.
Much scholarly effort has been put into understanding the issue of interorganizational
mobility and employee turnover and their antecedents and consequences, with most work
housed in the Macro HR literature and the Micro OB literature. In both of these
literatures though, researchers have struggled with two main issues. First, it is hard to
know whether a move was voluntary or not. In the search context, all the moves (and the
attempted moves) are triggered by the unilateral contact by the search firm, which makes
it easier to rule out mobility events (i.e., layoffs) due to performance issues. Second, in
most studies, researchers usually only observe the successful cases of people who are
already occupying those positions. Without knowing the entire consideration set at the
time of the selection, however, we are unable to fully grasp what is the driving force of
the patterns that we see in the real world, specifically the demand- or the supply-side
forces. The executive search firm context allows researchers to overcome this issue, as
they accumulate information on the entire filtering process of the search, which allows
the comparison of the attributes of successful and unsuccessful candidates. This is the
feature that I take advantage of in Chapters 2 and 3 of my dissertation.
In Chapter 2 of my dissertation, I explore the effect of various career attributes on
the individual’s chance of successfully moving to a subsequent job. Results from this
study suggest that the effect of prior mobility is negative, but only after controlling for
diversity of functional experience, which has a positive effect. I also find a negative
effect of tenure at the current firm on the likelihood of receiving an offer, once
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controlling for internal promotions. The results suggest that moving across employers
makes workers more attractive to future employers when the worker is able to build
functional diversity. Otherwise it is penalizing. Similarly, tenure at the current company
only helps when the worker is able to show competence via internal promotion. This
study sheds light on labor market competition by highlighting the attributes that
employers are most likely to compete over. This will inform firms on how they can adjust
their recruitment and retention strategy in response, and workers on how they might
maximize their long-term career outcomes by crafting the kinds of career trajectories that
may be most attractive to outside employers. This work also contributes to the strategic
human capital literature by suggesting a mechanism that occurs at the pre-hiring stage to
isolate mobility of workers: specifically, the screening out of candidates who are
perceived to be serial job hoppers.
Secondly, as an important actor in the market for senior managers, it is critical to
understand what role search firms play as gatekeepers in enabling or restricting access to
certain groups of people. Most current research suggests that search firms exacerbate the
gap between those who are privileged and under-privileged, possibly because of their
tendency to be conservative in carrying out the search for their clients. There is also some
evidence that gives us hope, though, that search firms may serve as a conduit through
which good practices are propagated, such as the hiring of women for boards of directors.
In Chapter 3, I explore how the clients’ preferences for certain attributes of
candidates (agentic vs. communal) impact the gender-based selection that is done by the
client firm and the search firm respectively. Drawing from role congruity theory, I expect
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that the emphasis on agentic attributes reduces the likelihood that female candidates are
selected, and the reverse for communal attributes. I use the parsed data from the job
descriptions of vacancies to measure clients’ preferences for each attribute. Even though
job descriptions are central to any hiring and reveal information about the mental models
that firms have about an ideal candidate, they have not received much attention in the
current literature. The results suggest that the emphasis on agentic or communal attributes
do not have much impact on the gender-based selection in the final round of the search
that the client firm is responsible for. Instead, I found evidence that the gender-based
selection in part happens at the initial creation of the contact pool and may also take place
during the selection process that the search firm is responsible for. These findings
suggests that one source of discrepancy between the client firm’s and search firm’s
selection is the interpretation of preferences. It extends the role congruity theory by
suggesting that gender-based selection can manifest itself more severely when those who
explicitly state the preferences for certain qualities and those who make the selection are
separate parties.
Lastly, the brokering role that executive search firms play helps us understand the
dynamics of intermediated markets. Because search firms work with client firms on a
contractual basis and represent the clients, one obvious connection can be drawn to other
types of professional services firms such as law firms, consulting firms, and investment
banks despite the differences between these contexts due to the nature of the services they
provide. This analogy can be drawn once we start to bring in the actors who are directly
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brokered by the search firm, for example, the previous employer of the executive who is
hired by the search firm’s client firm.
This is the approach that I take in my last chapter, Chapter 4, in which I
investigate the formation of client ties between the firm that experienced a senior
manager’s departure and the search firm who facilitated that turnover. Results from
hazard models suggest that, in fact, the firms that lost their employees to the clients of the
search firm are more likely to become clients of the search firm compared to those who
were at risk of but were not poached, suggesting that the dynamics that would hurt most
other organizations may actually provide opportunities for these brokers. The effect is
stronger for poached firms that are located outside the city where the search firm is
located, suggesting that the poaching event may help the search firm increase its saliency
towards its potential clients. These results bring a unique insight into the dynamics of
relationship formation and the role of brokers in such contexts.
There is more work to be done that extends the investigation that I have started in
my three empirical chapters with access to additional sources of data. For example, indepth interviews with search consultants will help us understand better the process of
crafting job descriptions. How much impact does search firm have on the client firms’
selection criteria when they collectively work on these documents? Also, having more
information about the search consultants themselves may illuminate some of the
mechanisms at play. How do their own previous work experiences and demographic
characteristics come into play when they are making selections? How does their
experience with previous searches affect what they do in subsequent searches? Answers
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to these questions will not only help us predict better which candidate will have higher
chances of getting selected under which circumstances, but also understand different
types of cognitive factors that play a role in selections that can be generalized to other
contexts. In addition, related to Chapter 4, it will be helpful to be able to observe other
options that the potential client firms have when they need to decide which search firms
to hire, including their current and previous relationships with other search firms. It may
be challenging to comprehensively collect information with regard to this issue, but at the
least interviewing the relevant department in client firms and understanding the process
of working with search firms will help us better understand the process and confirm the
validity of the predictions and results.
My hope is for more scholars to understand the value of the executive search
context, more search firms to collaborate with researchers, and ultimately to see more
work coming out of the search context that will deepen our understanding of the
executive labor market, executive careers, and the dynamics of the intermediated market.
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TABLES

1. Chapter 1
Table 1.1: Likelihood of hiring search firms

Frequency
Uncertainty
Asset-specificity
Information

Legitimacy

More likely to hire search firm
when
(at the firm level)
Hiring needs happen in low frequency

Lacking external networks to identify
candidates (e.g., young firms)

More likely to hire search firm when
(at the search level)
Hiring process is not costly to monitor
Position is low in asset-specificity
Position needs to tap into a pool outside
the existing networks (e.g., gender and
racial minority)

Hard to establish legitimacy (e.g.,
young firms, firms with poor
performace, firms with complex
structure of stakeholders)
Position is strategically important

Confidentiality

Table 1.2: Current literature and gaps for future work
Question
Who gets
ahead in the
executive
labor
market?

How does
intermediated
market
function?

Current literature
 How does fit matter in executive
selection?
 What affects worker’s propensity to
move?

Gaps for future work
How do various
characteristics from work
experiences matter? (Job
Mobility – Chapter 2)

“Gatekeepers”

 How do search firms give or restrict
access to certain groups of
candidates? (gender, ethnicity, elite
backgrounds)

“Brokers”

 How do embeddedness and
dependency affect the broker’s
relationships with each party?

What is the source of the
difference between the
search firm and the client
firm?
(Client preference and
gender-based selection –
Chapter 3)
Why do some firms use
search firms?
(Information vs. Threat
– Chapter 4)
Why do ESFs work on a
retainer basis?

“Windows”
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2. Chapter 2
Table 2.1: Summary statistics and correlations
Mean S.D.

1

2

3

4

5

6

1 Frequency of employer change

0.24

1.02

1.00

2 Functional diversity

0.21

1.05

0.61

1.00

0.5

0.27

0.01

0.00

1.00

4.64 -0.44 -0.31

0.00

1.00

1.8

1.53 -0.26 -0.21 -0.01

0.50

1.00

0.34

0.47 -0.01 -0.04 -0.06

0.02

0.03

16.33

7.46 -0.07 -0.01 -0.01

0.07

0.03 -0.01
0.23

3 Erraticism
4 Tenure in current company
5 Num. of positions in current company
6 Female
7 Experience

4.53

7

8

9

10

11

1.00

0.13

0.33 -0.08 -0.08

0.04

0.15

0.05 -0.07

1.00

9 Time in current job

2.95

2.93 -0.24 -0.17

0.00

0.57 -0.11 -0.01 -0.01

0.00

1.00

10 Functional similarity

0.49

0.5

0.03

0.08 -0.05

0.02

1.00

11 Industry similarity

0.44

0.5 -0.02 -0.18

0.03

12 Promotion

0.29

0.46 -0.03

13 Demotion

0.13

0.33

14 Number of functions in current company

1.31

0.74 -0.293 -0.214 0.147 0.507 0.702 0.017 0.034 0.184 -0.085 -0.094 0.094

0.02

0.01 -0.15 -0.01 -0.03

13

1.00

8 High status employer

0.00

12

0.00

0.14

0.08

0.07

0.04

0.08

0.01

1.00

0.00

0.01

0.06

0.05 -0.03 -0.03

0.01

0.03

0.06

0.03

0.03

0.04 -0.06 -0.07

0.01

1.00

0.07 -0.07 -0.03 -0.10 -0.03 -0.25
0.06

1.00
-0.04
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Table 2.2: Ordinary least squares regression predicting mediating variables
Dependent Variables:
Frequency of employer change

1
Func.
Diversity
0.487**
[0.0218]

Tenure in current company
Female

-0.00556
[0.0470]
Experience
-0.00122
[0.00300]
Position at current employer (Base category: Manager)
Associate Director
0.297
[0.227]
Director
-0.0448
[0.0854]
VP
-0.0863
[0.0913]
SVP/EVP
-0.0478
[0.113]
C-Level
-0.0682
[0.0934]
CEO
-0.603+
[0.329]
Other
0.364
[0.227]
Education (Base category: No advanced degree)
MBA
0.175**
[0.0491]
PhD
0.112
[0.0924]
MD
0.105
[0.0701]
JD
0.144
[0.0981]
LLM
-0.547+
[0.281]
MA
0.108*
[0.0447]
Constant
0.0642
[0.0901]
Observations
1,712
R-squared
0.249
Standard errors in brackets
** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1

2
No. of
Positions

0.163**
[0.00691]
0.0432
[0.0679]
0.00337
[0.00434]
0.112
[0.328]
-0.156
[0.123]
-0.151
[0.132]
-0.315+
[0.162]
-0.464**
[0.135]
-0.555
[0.475]
1.243**
[0.328]
0.173*
[0.0708]
0.224+
[0.133]
0.228*
[0.101]
-0.217
[0.142]
-0.0301
[0.405]
0.0247
[0.0648]
1.056**
[0.132]
1,712
0.281
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Table 2.3: The effect of mobility signals on the likelihood of receiving an offer
Frequency of employer change

1
-0.0763
[0.0689]

Functional diversity

2
-0.183*
[0.0794]
0.237**
[0.0870]

Tenure in current company

3

4

0.00959
[0.0165]

-0.0316
[0.0226]
0.154**
[0.0542]

5
-0.164+
[0.0864]
0.190*
[0.0918]
-0.0362
[0.0235]
0.123*
[0.0566]

0.226
[0.148]
0.00555
[0.00943]
0.405*
[0.197]
0.016
[0.0314]
0.169
[0.145]
0.136
[0.153]
0.0985
[0.224]
0.152
[0.377]
0.075
[0.256]
1,712

0.207
[0.148]
0.0059
[0.00949]
0.404*
[0.198]
0.0238
[0.0318]
0.184
[0.146]
0.118
[0.153]
0.104
[0.224]
0.147
[0.379]
-0.234
[0.297]
1,712

Number of positions in current company
Tenure in current company (<=3)
Tenure in current company (>3)
Female
Experience
High status employer
Time in current job
Functional similarity
Industry similarity
Lateral move
(base category: promotion)
Demotion
(base category: promotion)
Erraticism
Observations

0.234
[0.147]
0.00372
[0.00938]
0.456*
[0.193]
-0.0262
[0.0230]
0.163
[0.144]
0.145
[0.152]
0.0633
[0.223]
0.154
[0.377]
0.0646
[0.255]
1,712

Standard errors in brackets; ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1

0.207
[0.147]
0.00492
[0.00943]
0.434*
[0.194]
-0.0128
[0.0236]
0.187
[0.145]
0.112
[0.153]
0.082
[0.224]
0.147
[0.379]
-0.319
[0.293]
1,712

0.234
[0.147]
0.00419
[0.00938]
0.454*
[0.195]
-0.0298
[0.0267]
0.164
[0.145]
0.138
[0.152]
0.0647
[0.222]
0.153
[0.377]
0.0621
[0.255]
1,712

6
-0.164+
[0.0869]
0.188*
[0.0919]

0.125*
[0.0568]
0.104
[0.0790]
-0.0520*
[0.0255]
0.209
[0.148]
0.00594
[0.00954]
0.385+
[0.199]
0.00645
[0.0339]
0.194
[0.146]
0.105
[0.154]
0.0884
[0.225]
0.127
[0.381]
-0.239
[0.298]
1,712
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Table 2.4: The effect of mobility signals on the likelihood of proceeding to the final round
Frequency of employer change

1
-0.0525
[0.0373]

Functional diversity

2
-0.024
[0.0427]
-0.0664
[0.0482]

Tenure in current company

3

4

-0.00501
[0.00928]

0.00918
[0.0124]
-0.0545+
[0.0316]

5
-0.0567
[0.0476]
-0.0369
[0.0509]
0.00349
[0.0127]
-0.0532
[0.0328]

0.0933
[0.0821]
-0.0124*
[0.00527]
0.200+
[0.118]
-0.0494**
[0.0172]
-0.0445
[0.0825]
-0.216*
[0.0864]
0.103
[0.123]
-0.294
[0.201]
-0.135
[0.145]
3,628

0.0927
[0.0822]
-0.0122*
[0.00528]
0.202+
[0.118]
-0.0520**
[0.0173]
-0.0477
[0.0826]
-0.214*
[0.0864]
0.0991
[0.123]
-0.293
[0.201]
-0.0739
[0.167]
3,628

Number of positions in current company
Tenure in current company (<=3)
Tenure in current company (>3)
Female
Experience
High status employer
Time in current job
Functional similarity
Industry similarity
Lateral move
(base category: promotion)
Demotion
(base category: promotion)
Erraticism
Observations

0.0859
[0.0821]
-0.0124*
[0.00526]
0.168
[0.117]
-0.0425**
[0.0123]
-0.0412
[0.0824]
-0.217*
[0.0863]
0.105
[0.122]
-0.284
[0.201]
-0.13
[0.145]
3,628

Standard errors in brackets; ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1

0.092
[0.0822]
-0.0125*
[0.00527]
0.177
[0.117]
-0.0463**
[0.0126]
-0.045
[0.0825]
-0.216*
[0.0863]
0.102
[0.123]
-0.284
[0.201]
-0.0227
[0.165]
3,628

0.0917
[0.0820]
-0.0122*
[0.00527]
0.182
[0.117]
-0.0338*
[0.0146]
-0.0446
[0.0825]
-0.214*
[0.0863]
0.108
[0.122]
-0.285
[0.201]
-0.13
[0.145]
3,628

6
-0.0572
[0.0476]
-0.038
[0.0509]

-0.0523
[0.0328]
0.0316
[0.0427]
0.000195
[0.0135]
0.0934
[0.0823]
-0.0123*
[0.00528]
0.200+
[0.118]
-0.0551**
[0.0180]
-0.0459
[0.0827]
-0.215*
[0.0865]
0.0972
[0.123]
-0.291
[0.201]
-0.0724
[0.167]
3,628
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3. Chapter 3
Table 3.1: Varying topic groups across different topic number specifications

10 topics
GROUP 10-A: leadership financial relationship building influence
role credibility respect position trust key consensus analysis
international familiarity state responsive regulatory travel
GROUP 10-B: leadership professional personal style mission
integrity driven values commitment presence sensitivity motivate
builder manner flexible willingness standards thinking issues

15 topics
GROUP 15-A: team leadership style results people player open
judgment hands flexible achieve willingness energetic deliver
savvy politically potential mentor serve
GROUP 15-B: leadership relationship staff building diverse
influence collaborative build credibility respect members trust
develop groups consensus engage responsive negotiating
volunteers
GROUP 15-C: commitment mission community driven values
leadership appreciation thinking diversity state promote travel
philosophy center sensitivity catholic institution impact core

20 topics
GROUP 20-A: team style results people leadership player hands
builder open flexible willingness energetic motivating deliver
exceptional mentor serve confident passionate
GROUP 20-B:leadership staff community develop capacity members
appreciation motivate administrative groups inspire engage
volunteers network manner partnerships collaboratively
colleagues efforts
GROUP 20-C:leadership relationship building collaborative build
influence credibility respect trust consensus negotiating
responsive consistent demeanor visible interactive recognize
basis promoting
GROUP 20-D:commitment professional personal mission integrity
driven values presence thinking sensitivity promote philosophy
center ethics catholic core stewardship impeccable honesty
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Table 3.2: Bag of words for each topic
Labels
A Education
(informal)

degree business administration field public bachelor master engineering mba advanced relevant
graduate discipline science masters undergraduate college cpa certification
leadership influence build data credibility respect trust consensus direction responsive establish
visible difficult quick interactive recognize basis innovation capabilities

(formal)

leadership senior executive community board position members corporate administrative
groups director president staff volunteers capital investment foundation ceo administrators

B Leadership
C

D (managing

team style leadership people player hands flexible focused energetic articulate proactive
motivating member mentor serve passionate recruiting brand sleeves

E Management

organization change environment complex sensitivity culture multi competitive political
cultural fast matrix issues context paced ambiguity dynamic fiscal officer

F (managing

internal external direct complex manner constituencies situations thinker private group future
act customers relate media activities employees analyze partnerships

G (collaboration

on skills

relationship build collaborate staff diverse stakeholders negotiating consistent colleagues
demeanor network maintain constituents shared decisive peers partnership externally
impeccable
skill communicate interpersonal written presentation analytical open oral verbal listening
exceptional interact transparent honest write speak language inspirational english

Commitment
and values

commitment professional personal mission integrity driven values presence appreciation
standards promote philosophy center ethics catholic core stewardship addition thinking

teams;
mentorship)
(managing
change)

strategic
relationships)
)

H Communicati
I

J Strategy
K Financial and
technical
skills

L Operations
M Internally

inconsistent
topics

strategy business resource human marketing develop acumen plans plan execute compensation
planning training benefits design line visioning tactical benefit
financial experience services technology role process accounting finance broad background
expertise technical analyze familiarity functions institution deep budget reporting
management organization implement planning vision global operational operations supply
chain challenges operating prioritize marketplace conceptualize meeting models supplier
ensuring
experience years progressive industry education responsibility international profit responsible
general manufacturing operations prior department complexity commercial facilities arts
industrial
record track develop performance system accountability management initiatives time ensure
mentoring metrics enhance driving mindset identifying experienced emphasis alignment
management knowledge relations project practices information extensive functional risk
employee office computer software consulting compliance labor federal expert policies
decision service customer judgment processes system information solutions focus cost thinking
savvy ideas political people sound innovative evidence intelligence
deliver company support sales quality growth improvement principles partner practice
outcomes innovative negotiation safety revenue comprehensive continuous concepts integrated
results goals achieve multiple objectives motivate capacity willingness project deal inspire term
engage travel action goal demands detail order
develop programs product issues research market create diversity key program potential talent
person identify interest impact social efforts strengths
sense environment creative opportunity energy entrepreneurial problem function approach
clear solving drive priorities passion positive starter confidence initiative humor
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Table 3.3: Predicting the probability of receiving a job offer (Conditional logit)
1
3
4
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
-0.686 0.346 -0.302
1.142 -0.555
0.237 3.764* -0.977
0.302
0.222
0.227
0.229
[1.193] [0.856] [0.690] [1.264] [0.863] [0.706] [1.790] [1.201] [1.044] [0.154] [0.154] [0.154]
Female * Lead (f)
-2.25
[16.33]
Female * Lead (team)
10.37
[13.12]
Female * Mgmt (str)
-18.25
[25.08]
Female * Str
15.3
[16.57]
Female * Tech
-0.142
[13.20]
Female * Op
72.85*
[36.89]
Female * Comm
23.68
[23.37]
Female * Value
-1.474
[21.08]
Mobility * Value
-9.334
[10.54]
Func. Diversity * Mgmt (str)
12.19
[12.26]
Tenure * Mgmt (change)
-3.045
[2.572]
Observations 1,547
1,547
1,547
1,547
1,547
1,547
1,547
1,547
1,547
1,547
1,547
1,547
Standard errors in brackets
** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1
Female
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Table 3.4: Predicting the characteristics of successful candidates using topics

A: Edu
B: Lead (inf)
C: Lead (f)
D: Lead
(team)
E: Mgmt
(change)
F: Mgmt
(str. rel.)
G: Mgmt
(collab)
H: Comm
skills
I: Value
J: Strategy
K: Fin/tech
L:
Operations

(1) Logit

(5) OLS

Female

Mobility

-7.123
[31.79]
54.56
[47.23]
-8.04
[31.52]
-82.48**
[28.54]
-53.68
[45.93]
-117.7*
[46.41]
-1.261
[43.75]
103.7*
[44.72]
-38.9
[34.16]
23.49
[31.42]
-17.81
[27.18]

-2.706
[9.674]
4.906
[13.03]
-11.9
[7.906]
1.261
[8.262]
-7.394
[12.41]
14.86
[11.85]
-0.546
[12.74]
-6.903
[12.16]
-14.89
[9.876]
-13.31
[8.738]
-10.39
[7.320]

-154.4*
[73.27]
9.576
[9.702]
266

(6) OLS
Tenure at
the current
employer
13.44
[39.53]
25.16
[53.25]
-6.03
[32.31]
-21.19
[33.76]
-34.14
[50.73]
-9.345
[48.42]
64.41
[52.06]
54.12
[49.67]
29.28
[40.36]
58.23
[35.71]
7.756
[29.91]

-20.36+
128.2**
[11.65]
[47.59]
Constant
4.341
-11.85
[2.693]
[11.00]
Observations
266
266
R-squared
0.137
0.116
Standard errors in brackets ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1

(7) OLS
Functional
diversity
7.233
[10.16]
2.769
[13.68]
-10.67
[8.301]
-2.929
[8.675]
-11.21
[13.03]
-7.396
[12.44]
10.54
[13.38]
2.49
[12.76]
-12.84
[10.37]
-28.48**
[9.175]
-6.909
[7.686]
-2.09
[12.23]
2.554
[2.828]
266
0.155
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Table 3.5: Gender-based selection at the initial contact stage

(1) Logit

A: Edu
B: Lead (inf)
C: Lead (f)
D: Lead
(team)
E: Mgmt
(change)
F: Mgmt
(str. rel.)
G: Mgmt
(collab)
H: Comm
skills
I: Value
J: Strategy
K: Fin/tech
L: Operations
Prior relationship = 1
Log(salary) of vacancy
Constant
Observations
R-squared
Standard errors in brackets
** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1

Female
-16.64**
[1.638]
-0.318
[2.058]
6.131**
[1.134]
-7.424**
[1.394]
-10.45**
[2.047]
-0.538
[1.731]
0.288
[2.039]
18.66**
[2.098]
1.657
[1.681]
30.63**
[1.434]
-9.822**
[1.100]
3.397+
[1.954]
0.00937
[0.00677]
-0.0537**
[0.00707]
-1.157*
[0.455]
59,200

(2) OLS
proportion of
female
-2.543
[1.742]
-1.533
[2.253]
1.941
[1.392]
-2.911*
[1.477]
-2.151
[2.181]
-1.648
[2.071]
-1.295
[2.260]
2.985
[2.186]
-0.479
[1.768]
4.181**
[1.523]
-1.571
[1.321]
-0.827
[2.038]
0.000834
[0.00771]
-0.0207*
[0.00917]
0.884+
[0.510]
279
0.362

139
Table 3.6: Exploratory factor analysis of the topics
Variable

Factor1

Factor2

Factor3

Factor4

Factor5

Education

-0.263

-0.5019

-0.4431

-0.0872

-0.027

Uniquene
ss
0.4531

Leadership
(informal)

0.7363

-0.1275

0.0225

0.0705

0.1206

0.3864

-0.254

-0.2611

0.5616

-0.2456

-0.2911

0.3328

-0.0748

0.8564

-0.1046

-0.0676

-0.0802

0.2478

0.6026

-0.1833

-0.0231

0.3892

0.1215

0.3848

-0.0299

-0.0419

0.0062

-0.302

0.9237

0.2136

0.5551

0.1129

0.3279

-0.084

-0.1168

0.5177

-0.1281

0.7964

0.0875

-0.1138

0.0415

0.32

0.4501

-0.2608

0.1358

-0.3706

0.0636

0.5354

0.0094

-0.0308

-0.8377

-0.1191

-0.0782

0.3055

-0.6785

-0.0842

0.3515

0.1935

0.3331

0.369

0.0062

-0.1259

0.0956

0.9134

-0.2878

0.236

(formal)
(managing teams;
mentorship)
Managing
relationships

Communication
skills
Commitment and
values
Strategy
Financial and
technical skills
Operations and
supply
management
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Table 3.7: Predicting the characteristics of candidates using factors

(1) Logit

(5) OLS

(6) OLS
Tenure at
Female
Mobility
the current
employer
Factor 1
0.039
0.0523
0.164
[0.271]
[0.0850]
[0.350]
Factor 2
0.025
0.096
-0.044
[0.227]
[0.0757]
[0.312]
Factor 3
-0.0454
-0.0185
-0.228
[0.235]
[0.0725]
[0.298]
Factor 4
-0.373
-0.0895
0.467
[0.315]
[0.0770]
[0.317]
Factor 5
-0.212
0.116+
-0.273
[0.249]
[0.0698]
[0.287]
Constant
-3.909
0.656
3.831
[2.458]
[0.759]
[3.123]
Observations
266
266
266
R-squared
0.111
0.077
Standard errors in brackets; ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1

(7) OLS
Functional
diversity
0.0161
[0.0899]
0.088
[0.0801]
0.114
[0.0767]
0.0294
[0.0814]
-0.0211
[0.0738]
-0.932
[0.803]
266
0.116

141
4. Chapter 4
Table 4.1: Summary statistics and correlations (N=1577)

1
2
3
4
5
6

Became client
Poached
Specialty
Public firm
Located in the same city
Employee moved to
competitor

Mean
0.02
0.20
0.40
0.14
0.19

S.D.
0.14
0.40
0.49
0.35
0.39

1
1.00
0.08
0.04
0.03
0.04

2

3

4

5

1.00
0.00
0.08
0.00

1.00
-0.29
-0.17

1.00
0.04

1.00

0.48

0.50

-0.01

-0.01

0.54

-0.21

-0.10

Table 4.2: Cox hazard model predicting the hazard ratio of client relationship formation

(1)
Poached
2.738**
[0.965]
Located in the same city

(2)
2.551**
[0.908]
1.606
[0.702]
Poached*Located in the same city
Specialty
Public firm

2.180+
[0.878]
2.048
[0.991]

(3)
3.581**
[1.411]
2.991*
[1.510]
0.138+
[0.159]
2.245*
[0.920]
2.174
[1.063]

Employee moved to
competitor

(4)
3.110*
[1.636]
2.870*
[1.456]
0.141+
[0.165]
3.145*
[1.461]
2.082
[1.013]
0.462
[0.247]
1.404

Poached*Employee moved to
competitor

[1.017]
Observations
1,577
1,577
Standard error in
exponentiated form in
brackets
** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1

1,577

1,577
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FIGURES

1. Chapter 1
Figure 1.1: The "Make or Buy" decision that firms make
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2. Chapter 2
Figure 2.1: The proposed model
H2c

+
Relative frequency of
employer change

Functional diversity
(Signal of breadth)

H2b

H2a

+

H1

-

Perceived to be a
serial job-hopper

Probability of receiving an
offer

H3

-

Tenure at the current firm

Perceived to be culturally
inflexible
H4b

+

Internal promotion
(Signal of competence)
H4c

+
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Figure 2.2: The candidate filtering process at SearchCo

Contacted by
SearchCo

Interview at
SearchCo

Interview with
client firm

(n=3628)

(n=1712)

Offer extended

Offer accepted

(n=376)

(n=362)

47.1 % from previous
round

* The dotted line represents the stage of selection that is used in this paper.
Figure 2.3: An example of resume parsing procedure
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3. Chapter 3
Figure 3.1: Scree plot of eigenvalues after factor analysis

4. Chapter 4
Figure 4.1: An example of a publicized search that reveals the identity of the search firm

Source: USA Today, April 2014

